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Antitrust in Digital Markets 
John M. Newman* 
Antitrust law has largely failed to address the challenges posed by 
digital markets. At the turn of the millennium, the antitrust enterprise engaged 
in intense debate over whether antitrust doctrine, much of it developed during 
a bygone era of smokestack industries, could or should evolve to address digital 
markets. Eventually, a consensus emerged: although the basic doctrine is supple 
enough to apply to new technologies, courts and enforcers should adopt a 
defendant-friendly, hands-off approach. 
But this pro-defendant position is deeply—and dangerously—flawed. 
Economic theory, empirical research, and extant judicial and regulatory 
authority all contradict the prevailing views regarding power, conduct, and 
efficiencies in digital markets. Far from being self-correcting, digital markets 
facilitate the creation and maintenance of uniquely durable market power. 
Digital markets are conducive to complex anticompetitive strategies that have 
largely escaped regulatory scrutiny. Perhaps most importantly, digital-market 
conduct tends to lack significant offsetting efficiencies. 
As a result, the consensus view is ripe for rejection. Digital markets do 
require a different approach, but it must be uniquely interventionist, not 
unusually laissez-faire. This Article concludes by offering a set of doctrinal and 
policy proposals aimed at creating a more robust, vigilant, and welfare-
enhancing digital antitrust enterprise. 
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I was surprised to read . . . that there are criticisms being made of 
Amazon, Microsoft, and Google. I was shocked. That’s blasphemy. 
 
—Richard Posner1 
INTRODUCTION 
At the turn of the millennium, the antitrust enterprise 
underwent an intense bout of soul-searching. This introspective turn 
was prompted by the high-profile litigation against Microsoft in the 
United States, one of the earliest instances of antitrust law being used 
to target strategic conduct in a digital market.2 Was antitrust 
doctrine—developed primarily in a bygone era of smokestack 
industries—appropriately designed for the digital age? 
In a widely influential essay published in 2000, Richard Posner 
provided what became the consensus view: “[A]ntitrust doctrine is 
supple enough . . . to take in stride the competitive issues presented by 
the new economy.”3 Even so, he argued, the risk of false positives 
dictates a hands-off approach to digital markets.4 Posner’s position, in 
other words, was that digital markets are not novel enough to warrant 
explicitly different antitrust rules, but are novel enough to warrant 
unusually defendant-friendly treatment. 
No explicitly different rules for digital markets emerged in 
subsequent years,5 and there is widespread agreement that none are 
 
 1. Stigler Center, Judge Richard A. Posner in Conversation with Professor Luigi Zingales, 
YOUTUBE (Mar. 30, 2017), https://youtu.be/JRCm_gJ2EOk [https://perma.cc/5K5G-RN2R] (re-
marks of Judge Posner at 5:26). 
 2. Most previous antitrust cases involving personal computers had involved, at least in part, 
hardware markets. See United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 34, 91 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). The Microsoft antitrust litigation, which culminated in 2001 with the D.C. Circuit’s Mi-
crosoft III decision, immediately produced an outpouring of scholarly analysis. See, e.g., Ronald A. 
Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657 (2001); Robin Cooper Feldman, 
Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079 (1999); Franklin M. Fisher, The IBM and 
Microsoft Cases: What’s the Difference?, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 180 (2000); Howard A. Shelanski & J. 
Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2001); Philip J. 
Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534 (2003). 
 3. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 925 (2001). 
Posner’s essay was, as of September 2019, one of the twelve most-downloaded antitrust papers of 
all time on the Social Science Research Network. Antitrust & Regulated Industries eJournals, 
SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_Results.cfm?form_name=journalBrowse&journal_ 
id=305488&SortOrder=numHits%20desc (last visited Sept. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/D687-
MGG9]. 
 4. On the influential error-cost framework for antitrust analysis, see Frank H. Easterbrook, 
The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
 5. The lone judicial exception was Microsoft III itself, in which the D.C. Circuit decided that 
the markets at issue were novel enough to warrant rule-of-reason treatment for a tying arrange-
ment, instead of the long-standing quasi-per-se-illegality rule. 253 F.3d at 89–90.  
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needed.6 Of course, analysts continue to take the unique characteristics 
of each relevant market into account on a case-by-case basis.7 But the 
rules themselves do not (in theory, at least) vary based on the type of 
market at issue.8 
Posner’s preferred pro-defendant position also became the order 
of the day. Since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued 
its Microsoft III decision in 2001, the United States has experienced a 
near-total lack of antitrust enforcement in digital markets.9 The 
general consensus seems to be that power in digital markets will be rare 
 
 6. See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2007), 
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4PL6-KDQC] (“There is no need to revise the antitrust laws to apply different 
rules to industries in which innovation, intellectual property, and technological change are central 
features.”); Adam Candeub, Behavioral Economics, Internet Search, and Antitrust, 9 I/S: J.L. & 
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 407, 408 (2014) (“[R]egulators appear to rely upon traditional approaches, 
not specific to online behavior, assuming that market behavior online is not distinguishable from 
behavior in the brick and mortar world.”); Timothy J. Muris & Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust 
in the Internet Era: The Legacy of United States v. A&P, at i (Geo. Mason Univ. Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 18-15, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3186569 [https://perma.cc/87SN-Q7TN] (“[A]ntitrust doctrine does not need an over-
haul. It is . . . flexible enough to address any monopoly abuses in today’s economy.”); Pablo Ibáñez 
Colomo, A Contribution to ‘Shaping Competition Policy in the Era of Digitisation’ 2 (Sept. 30, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3257998 
[https://perma.cc/3PQZ-2DF9] (“The phenomena that have been identified in digital markets are 
in no way unique to them.”). Mainstream institutional analysts generally favor a transsubstantive 
approach to crafting antitrust doctrine. Consider, for example, the influential Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (“HMGs”) promulgated jointly by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”): the HMGs purport to apply to all horizontal mergers that fall under 
these Agencies’ broad purview. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-re-
view/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q67D-LNV8] [hereinafter HMGS]. Similarly, the “rule of 
reason” that dominates modern civil conduct analysis purports to offer a unified framework that 
applies regardless of the relevant market at issue. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 
¶ 1500 (2017) (“Ever since [the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1911 Standard Oil decision], antitrust law 
has been governed by the ‘rule of reason.’ ”). 
 7. See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6 (“In industries in which in-
novation, intellectual property, and technological change are central features, just as in other in-
dustries, antitrust enforcers should . . . ensure proper attention to economic and other character-
istics of particular industries that may, depending on the facts at issue, have an important bearing 
on a valid antitrust analysis.”). 
 8. Whether this universality remains (or, indeed, was ever) an accurate description of anti-
trust in action is debatable. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, How Much of Health Care Antitrust 
Is Really Antitrust?, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 643 (2017) (documenting “distortions” of antitrust law as 
applied to healthcare industries); see also Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for 
Innovation, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 637 (arguing in favor of industry-specific antitrust policy as 
a means of better promoting dynamic efficiency). That said, analysts from the centrist, see, for 
example, Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Modesty, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (2007) (“Hovenkamp 
defends the antitrust status quo . . . .”), to the right, see, for example, Joshua D. Wright, The Rob-
erts Court and the Chicago School of Antitrust: The 2006 Term and Beyond, 3 COMP. POL’Y INT’L 
24, 54 (2007) (noting the Roberts Court’s “familiarity and expertise with [antitrust] subject mat-
ter”), appear to be basically satisfied with the current state of antitrust doctrine. 
 9. The few exceptions are discussed infra, in Sections III.A and IV.A. 
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and fleeting, and that enforcement efforts would entail a prohibitively 
high risk of chilling innovation.10 
But is the consensus correct? Or are digital markets 
fundamentally different, such that different rules are appropriate? 
Moreover, even if antitrust rules are “supple enough” to address digital 
markets, is purposefully lax enforcement an effective means of 
promoting the goals of antitrust law? 
Today, antitrust doctrine finds itself again confronting a “new 
economy.” The concerns about desktop computer operating systems 
that motivated the Microsoft litigation appear ever more quaint. 
Computers are vastly more capable, yet can now fit into users’ pockets 
and be worn as bracelets or eyeglasses.11 Software is increasingly 
delivered as a service, rather than installed as a product.12 Is antitrust 
doctrine “supple enough” to address manipulation of search results?13 
Algorithm-based collusion?14 Markets without prices?15 Markets 
wherein digital data acts as currency,16 a competitive advantage,17 a 
means of increasing product quality,18 or all three at once?19 
 
 10. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The 
Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 178 (2011) (denouncing 
even the theoretical possibility of a case against Google as creating a “substantial risk for a false 
positive” that would chill innovation). 
 11. See generally WEARABLES, http://www.wearables.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/X9WV-A8BQ] (displaying news regarding and product reviews of wearable tech-
nology). 
 12. See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 329–31 (2015) 
(highlighting the unique intangibility of data). 
 13. See, e.g., James D. Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Is There a Market for Organic Search 
Engine Results and Can Their Manipulation Give Rise to Antitrust Liability?, 10 J. COMPETITION 
L. & ECON. 517 (2014). 
 14. See Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 
100 MINN. L. REV. 1323 (2016). 
 15. See, e.g., Magali Eben, Market Definition and Free Online Services: The Prospect of Per-
sonal Data as Price, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 227 (2018); David S. Evans, The Antitrust 
Economics of Free, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 71 (2011); Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The 
Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (2016); 
Salil K. Mehra, Competition Law for a Post-Scarcity World, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1 (2016); John M. 
Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Applications, 94 WASH U. L. REV. 49 (2016) [hereinafter 
Newman, Applications]; John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. 
PA. L. REV. 149 (2015) [hereinafter Newman, Foundations]. 
 16. See Newman, Foundations, supra note 15. 
 17. MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY § 4.34 
(2016) (“Big Data has important competitive and privacy implications. Companies will compete for 
a data-advantage.”). 
 18. See James C. Cooper, Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, 
and Subjectivity, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129, 1129 (2013) (“The analogy between privacy and 
quality begins to break down once we recognize that, as opposed to selecting lower quality levels 
to enjoy lower costs, firms invest in collecting and analyzing data to improve content and to en-
hance matching between sellers and consumers who have heterogeneous tastes for privacy.”). 
 19. See id. 
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This Article contends that digital markets are different, such 
that they deserve—indeed, demand—unique treatment under the 
antitrust laws. Three concepts are of primary importance to the 
institutional design of modern antitrust: power, harm, and efficiencies. 
In each of these areas, proponents of the status quo have overlooked, 
ignored, and sometimes distorted reality. 
Part I of this Article demonstrates that digital markets facilitate 
uniquely durable market power, in ways that reach far beyond what 
previous analyses have imagined.20 Part II develops novel theories of 
digital-market harm and—proceeding beyond theory—draws on 
original analysis of dominant firms’ investor statements to identify 
real-world instances in which such harms appear to have occurred.21 
Part II also identifies multiple features that render digital markets 
uniquely susceptible to more familiar types of harm.22 Through 
examination and application of the extant case law and formal agency 
guidance, Part III establishes that digital-market conduct tends to lack 
any significant offsetting efficiencies.23 
All of this suggests that the pro-defendant status quo is deeply 
misguided. The balance of error costs is the inverse of what orthodox 
analysts previously assumed: false positives are relatively rare and 
costless, while false negatives are relatively common and costly. Thus, 
digital markets require a more interventionist approach. 
Unfortunately, the antitrust enterprise has thus far chosen to 
maintain a hands-off approach to digital markets. Digital defendants 
have received, and continue to receive, a free pass in the form of de jure 
and de facto immunity and leniency.24 This Article proposes an 
immediate reversal of that mistaken course. The ground beneath 
antitrust law’s consumer-welfare standard—firmly settled for 
decades—may be shifting.25 But regardless of which goal is preferred, 
 
 20. See infra Part I. 
 21. See infra Sections II.A–B. 
 22. See infra Sections II.C–D. 
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. For an excellent description of how regulatory action (and nonaction) can produce de facto 
legal immunity, see Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (2019); see also Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring 
Businesses in an Age of Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (2019). 
 25. See, e.g., Mark Glick, The Unsound Theory Behind the Consumer (and Total) Welfare Goal 
in Antitrust, 63 ANTITRUST BULL. 455 (2018) (identifying the deeply flawed theoretical underpin-
nings of the consumer-welfare standard); Marshall Steinbaum, The Consumer Welfare Standard 
Is an Outdated Holdover from a Discredited Economic Theory, ROOSEVELT INST. BLOG (Dec. 11, 
2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/consumer-welfare-standard-outdated-holdover-discredited-
economic-theory/ [https://perma.cc/TL43-QVK3] (“This week, the Senate Judiciary Committee is 
holding a hearing about the consumer welfare standard to determine whether it is outdated or 
remains the worthwhile core principle of antitrust enforcement. The hearing comes amid wide-
spread questioning about antitrust’s effectiveness in recent decades.”). 
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the status quo has frequently failed in this vital area, and it continues 
to do so with alarming regularity.26 The laissez-faire approach 
advocated for by scholars and adopted by courts and enforcers has 
allowed potentially massive harms to go unchecked. 
Part IV of this Article offers a set of concrete policy proposals, 
ranging from agency enforcement strategies to statutory and quasi-
regulatory solutions, designed to invert the current hands-off approach 
in favor of welfare-enhancing vigilance. If the antitrust enterprise is to 
play a meaningful role in years to come, it must evolve to address the 
unique challenges posed by digital markets. 
I. DURABLE MARKET POWER 
Many digital markets are highly concentrated, with a single 
dominant firm possessing a massive share. Various industry sources 
have identified Google, for example, as owning more than 90% of the 
“search” or “search engine” market.27 In the first quarter of 2019, 
Amazon reportedly captured 74% of all e-commerce transactions in the 
United States.28 Its share of certain categories like e-books may be 
higher still.29 As of October 2018, Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger 
were the three largest (in terms of users) mobile social networking apps 
in the United States.30 All three are controlled by the same firm: 
Facebook, Inc.31 Facebook’s dominance extends to the advertiser side of 
its social networking platforms, where it has consistently held a market 
share of more than 70%.32 Even global geographic markets are 
susceptible to surprisingly high concentration levels: by 2016, for 
 
 26. See, e.g., John M. Newman, Complex Antitrust Harm in Platform Markets, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRON. 5–8 (May 2017) , https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/complex-an-
titrust-harm-in-platform-markets-2/ [https://perma.cc/8CDY-EP82] (identifying the FTC’s uncon-
ditional clearance of the Zillow/Trulia acquisition as a likely false negative). 
 27. See, e.g., Search Engine Market Share Worldwide: June 2018-June 2019, STATCOUNTER, 
http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share (last visited July 27, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/MN6S-R7LQ]. 
 28. Kimberly Collins, Google + Amazon: Data on Market Share, Trends, Searches from Jump-
shot, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Aug. 1, 2019), https://searchenginewatch.com/2019/07/30/google-
and-amazon-jumpshot-data-market-share-trends-and-searches/ [https://perma.cc/EUD4-KYAA]. 
 29. Phil Wahba, Walmart is Bringing the Fight to Amazon’s Turf: E-books, FORTUNE (Jan. 26, 
2018), http://fortune.com/2018/01/25/walmart-ebooks/ [https://perma.cc/P7KN-875U]. 
 30. Top U.S. Mobile Social Apps by Users 2018, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statis-
tics/248074/most-popular-us-social-networking-apps-ranked-by-audience/ (last visited July 27, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/3DNK-R69Y]. 
 31. Id. Another Facebook-owned service, WhatsApp, ranked in the top ten. Id. 
 32. U.S. Facebook Social Network Ad Spend Share 2018, STATISTA, https://www.sta-
tista.com/statistics/241805/market-share-of-facebooks-us-social-network-ad-revenue/ (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/69YD-W9BQ]. 
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example, Google’s Android had captured 87.5% of the worldwide market 
for smartphone operating systems.33 
Even in narrower digital spaces, which are less likely to attract 
negative headlines and neo-Brandeisian condemnation,34 massive 
market shares are often the norm. In the market for digital real estate 
portals, for example, Zillow Group self-professedly controls 67% across 
all platforms and 78% of mobile users.35 The market for online mapping 
services is similarly dominated by a single firm, Alphabet, with its 
popular Google Maps.36 Though often overlooked due to the rise in 
popularity of smartphones, Microsoft continues to enjoy a nearly 80% 
market share of desktop operating systems37 two decades after a federal 
district court first held that Microsoft had monopolized that market. 
Certain unique features of digital markets allow for such high 
concentration levels. Some are relatively well-recognized. Some, 
however—particularly the crucial role of human attention—have only 
recently begun to be noticed by antitrust analysts.38 The following 
discussion identifies several contributing factors that can lead to 
uniquely durable power in digital markets. It also considers and rejects 
the primary arguments made by anti-enforcement scholars and 
stakeholders. 
A. Scarce Attention and Ecosystem Building 
As the amount of available information continues to increase 
exponentially, humans’ cognitive resources become ever-increasingly 
overloaded. The implications for market analysis and policy design are 
 
 33. Arjun Kharpal, Google Android Hits Market Share Record with Nearly 9 in Every 10 
Smartphones Using It, CNBC (Nov. 3, 2016, 5:03 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/03/google-
android-hits-market-share-record-with-nearly-9-in-every-10-smartphones-using-it.html 
[https://perma.cc/GAD7-TTDK]. 
 34. For an impassioned attack on the neo-Brandeisian movement, see Herbert J. 
Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled? (Univ. Pa. L. Sch. Inst. for Law 
& Econ., Research Paper No. 18-15, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3197329 [https://perma.cc/W6J9-YT6S]. 
 35. Newman, supra note 26, at 5. 
 36. One recent user survey revealed that nearly 80% of Android OS users cite Google Maps 
as their “favorite” map application. Greg Sterling, New Survey Says Google Maps Favored by 
Nearly 70 Percent of iPhone Users, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (June 15, 2016, 11:37 AM), 
https://searchengineland.com/new-survey-says-google-maps-favored-nearly-70-percent-iphone-us-
ers-251955 [https://perma.cc/6Z4K-N3EA]. Nearly 70% of Apple iPhone users also preferred 
Google Maps over Apple Maps. Id. 
 37. Desktop Operating System Market Share Worldwide: June 2018-June 2019, 
STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/desktop/worldwide (last visited July 27, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/5XA8-S27Z]. 
 38. See, e.g., Newman, Foundations, supra note 15 (developing the concept of “attention 
costs”); Tim Wu, Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941094 [https://perma.cc/2F6T-AAE6]. 
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enormous. Humans possess limited amounts of cognitive capacity.39 On 
an individual level, this scarcity manifests in two ways. First, mental 
processes can be overloaded by a surplus of distractions being present 
at a given time.40 Second, engaging in mental processes can reduce 
available cognitive capacity over time, much like driving a vehicle 
depletes its available fuel reserves.41 
In the world as it existed for untold millennia predating the 
Digital Era, information was relatively scarce.42 As a result, human 
attention and available cognitive load were relatively abundant.43 The 
limited nature of attention presented relatively few problems for 
decisionmaking.44 But in just a few short decades, that relationship 
inverted. Today, information has become abundant, and attention has 
grown scarce.45 By drastically lowering the marginal costs of 
reproducing and distributing information, the Internet became “the 
world’s largest copy machine.”46 Viewed through this lens, the 
convergence of digital computing and networking was perhaps the 
single most important event in the evolution of information 
technology.47  
The rising tide of information quickly became a flood. With it, 
the limited nature of attention was brought forcefully, even jarringly, 
to prominence.48 For the first time in human history, the amount of 
 
 39. Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World, in 
COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40–41 (M. Greenberger ed., 1971). 
 40. See, e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and 
Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 509 (1991) (summariz-
ing empirical findings that cognitive “busyness,” in the form of rehearsing an eight-digit number, 
can increase the likelihood that a test subject would apply an “activated” racial stereotype). 
 41. See, e.g., Roy F. Baumeister et al., The Strength Model of Self-Control, 16 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 351, 351 (2007) (“We observed that self-control appeared vulnerable to 
deterioration over time from repeated exertions, resembling a muscle that gets tired.”). 
 42. See generally TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE 
OUR HEADS (2016) (describing how the progression from print, to broadcast media, to personal 
computers and mobile phones eventually devoured nearly every available piece of human atten-
tion). 
 43. See Simon, supra note 39. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Prescient observers foresaw that the Internet would drastically accelerate this shift. See, 
e.g., Today, Flashback! The Internet in 1995, YOUTUBE (June 13, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95-yZ-31j9A [https://perma.cc/3YA8-64PT] (“I have no desire to 
be a part of the Internet because I feel like I’m so inundated with information all the time that 
I . . . don’t want more.”). 
 46. Lena Groeger, Kevin Kelly’s 6 Words for the Modern Internet, WIRED (June 22, 2011, 3:17 
PM), https://www.wired.com/2011/06/kevin-kellys-internet-words/ [https://perma.cc/5DLF-2V9B]. 
 47. See Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in 
the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313, 322 (2013) (“The importance of the dawn of the Network Era for 
content, communication, and now computing, cannot be overstated.”). 
 48. See Simon, supra note 39. 
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information available has swamped our ability to process it.49 As 
distractions increase, decisionmaking changes—and not for the 
better.50 Cognitive load impacts human behavior in ways that antitrust 
analysts have never before grappled with, having never needed to do 
so.51 Nowhere are those impacts felt as strongly as in digital markets, 
the central source of information overload in modern society. 
1. The Importance of Digital Portals 
The downside of information abundance—information 
overload—prompted the meteoric rise of services that compile and 
refine information into a more useful finished product. In the past, 
collection and production were often the most valuable roles played by 
suppliers. Today’s digital-focused firms instead play a reductionist role: 
they act as portals through which one can access only desired 
information and services.52 The most successful firms are those that 
offer the lowest-cognitive-burden means of doing so.53  
Google’s mission statement—to “organize the world’s 
information and make it universally accessible and useful”—reflects the 
importance of portals in digital markets.54 Google Search is a portal, 
albeit one with explicit designs on becoming the portal.55 Zillow, the 
leading online real estate portal, performs a similar function for real 
estate listings.56  
 
 49. See, e.g., Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention 
Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1467 (2004) (arguing 
that information abundance had already led to attention scarcity as early as 2004 and that the 
resulting overload was producing market failures in digital contexts). 
 50. See, e.g., 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND 
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 17:39 (2018) (“When decision makers are under cognitive load, 
that is, they are distracted by other tasks or concerns, they tend to be more likely to rely on judg-
ment shortcuts, including stereotypes, to direct information processing and simplify decisions.”); 
Alexander Chernev, When More Is Less and Less Is More: The Role of Ideal Point Availability and 
Assortment in Consumer Choice, 30 J. CONSUMER RES. 170 (2003) (identifying the paradox of 
choice: increasing the number of options available can counterintuitively lead to suboptimal deci-
sionmaking). 
 51. See Candeub, supra note 6, at 410–11. 
 52. See MARK R. PATTERSON, ANTITRUST LAW IN THE NEW ECONOMY: GOOGLE, YELP, LIBOR, 
AND THE CONTROL OF INFORMATION 37 (2017); Lina M. Khan, Three Forms and Sources of Tech 
Platform Power, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 325, 326 (2018) (describing the power that large technology 
companies possess as a “gatekeeping power”). 
 53. See Candeub, supra note 6, at 410–11; cf. Simon, supra note 39, at 42 (“An information-
processing subsystem . . . will reduce the net demand on the rest of the organization’s attention 
only if it absorbs more information previously received by others than it produces . . . .”). 
 54. About, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/about/our-company/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/6ZC8-7V33]. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See Newman, supra note 26, at 5. 
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Somewhat less well-recognized, though no less important, is the 
portal function served by online retailers like Amazon. As an industry 
analyst observes, Amazon has “mastered the art of selling me products 
I just don’t want to think about.”57 Of course, Amazon’s Prime 
subscription service does offer financial benefits. In fact, Amazon has 
displayed a somewhat unique willingness to forgo profits—and even to 
incur losses—in order to offer consumers a compelling value 
proposition.58 But Prime’s real attraction may be less financial and 
more psychological.59 It is a portal that offers all-you-can-eat, on-
demand, one-click access to anything consumers need—a vital service 
“in an era of too many choices.”60  
A substantial portion, perhaps even the lion’s share, of these 
portals’ power derives from their ability to assess and filter information. 
A digital portal lowers cognitive burden—and performs that service at 
a point in history when humans are desperately in need of it.61 As the 
flood of available data and information rises ever higher, the power of 
portals will continue to increase. 
Cognitive burden plays another crucial role in digital-portal 
markets. Not only does it help to explain the rise to prominence of the 
portal business model, but it also helps to explain why certain portals 
have emerged as such “sticky” market leaders.62 At the same time, it 
helps to explain why many sectors of the digital economy no longer 
exhibit much (if any) entry. Choosing and switching among different 
portals entails cognitive costs.63 Thus, if a given portal is able to acquire 
a leading position—whether via first-mover advantage, direct or 
indirect network effects, offering a superior product, or some 
 
 57. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Why You Cannot Quit Amazon Prime—Even if Maybe You Should, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2018/01/31/why-you-cannot-quit-amazon-prime-even-if-maybe-you-should/ 
[https://perma.cc/4TQZ-HLBF]. 
 58. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 746 (2017) 
(“Amazon has established dominance as an online platform thanks to two elements of its business 
strategy: a willingness to sustain losses and invest aggressively at the expense of profits, and in-
tegration across multiple business lines.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 57. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Goodman, supra note 49, at 1421. 
 62. On sticky digital services in general, see Paul T. Moura, The Sticky Case of Sticky Data: 
An Examination of the Rationale, Legality, and Implementation of a Right to Data Portability 
Under European Competition Law (2014) (unpublished MSc Dissertation, London School of Eco-
nomics), https://www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/research/mediaWorkingPapers/MScDissertationSeries/ 
2013/118-Moura.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR75-Y2GR] . 
 63. See, e.g., Daniel C. McFarlane & Kara A. Latorella, The Scope and Importance of Human 
Interruption in Human–Computer Interaction Design, 17 HUM.–COMPUTER INTERACTION 1, 6–7 
(2002) (surveying the literature on deleterious effects of interruptions and task-switching). 
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combination thereof—its advantage is magnified by users’ aversion to 
the cognitive costs of switching.64 
2. The Rise of Private Digital Ecosystems 
A firm that controls the primary portal to a particular digital 
product—general search results, for example—can protect its dominant 
position by creating an ecosystem comprising multiple portals among 
which users can easily switch. Alphabet-owned Google provides a ready 
example: As Candeub observes, “Google is more than a search engine. 
Through its links to services such as news, email, and YouTube, Google 
provides a gateway to the web that minimizes search time—and 
thereby the cognitive and time costs of using the web.”65 
Can creating a private digital ecosystem enhance an 
incumbent’s market power? Under a traditional antitrust analysis, 
Google’s acquisition of YouTube may not have appeared problematic. 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) cleared the transaction without 
conditions.66 Google, at the time, primarily provided general search 
results to users and users’ attention to advertisers. YouTube provided 
video hosting and streaming services to users and users’ attention to 
advertisers. Standard analysis apparently failed to indicate harm to 
either customer group. 
Using standard market-definition tools, an analyst could easily 
have concluded that the two firms did not directly compete for users.67 
General search results and video hosting/streaming services, in other 
words, may have appeared to constitute distinct antitrust “relevant 
markets” as that concept is traditionally employed.68 If so, the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“HMGs”) would have indicated that the 
 
 64. The dynamic at play is somewhat analogous to the unique power of “default” status in 
digital contexts. While eye-level shelf space in a brick-and-mortar store attracts around 35% more 
consumer attention than other shelves, “the first page of results on Google Search may receive 99 
times more clicks (effectively 9800% more clicks) than the second page of search results.” Cecilia 
(Yixi) Cheng, Competition for Defaults: The Fight for Virtual Shelf Space 2–3 (July 26, 2018) (un-
published manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3220267 [https:// 
perma.cc/7WSJ-9MRU]. 
 65. Candeub, supra note 6, at 410. 
 66. See Dawn Kawamoto, Google–YouTube Merger Clears Antitrust Review, CNET (Nov. 6, 
2006, 7:28 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/google-youtube-merger-clears-antitrust-review/ 
[https://perma.cc/N62E-HJSZ]. 
 67. An SSNIP-based hypothetical-monopolist test would have been difficult to apply. See 
Newman, Applications, supra note 15. But, alternative methodologies are available. The two prod-
ucts offer quite different functional characteristics, a factor the U.S. Supreme Court has relied on 
when defining markets. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 574 (1966) (finding 
that different levels of reliability as among different property-protection services justified a market 
definition narrower than the entire universe of property-protection services). 
 68. See HMGS, supra note 6, § 2.1.3. 
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proposed acquisition presented no competitive concerns vis-à-vis users. 
Absent competitive overlap, deals are exceedingly unlikely to draw 
agency challenges.69 
As to advertisers, the FTC may have concluded that demand was 
fairly elastic as between different digital avenues for display—perhaps 
even as between online and offline delivery.70 If so, standard antitrust 
analysis would likely have suggested a very broad relevant market. As 
a result, the merged firm would have appeared to possess a miniscule 
market share, and the HMGs would have again indicated that the 
proposed acquisition presented no competitive concerns.71 The deal 
would have appeared benign, as it apparently did to the FTC.72 
But Google may well have acquired YouTube in order to create 
a “lowest cognitive load” ecosystem around its core area of dominance, 
general search results.73 By lowering the cognitive load required to 
switch among portals, the YouTube acquisition may have entrenched, 
and even enhanced, Google’s dominance in its core search portal. Put 
another way, Google may have been constructing a moat around its 
castle. Industry observers have suggested as much.74  
The larger the private ecosystem, the lower the cognitive cost of 
switching among internally owned portals—but the larger the cost of 
switching to an externally owned portal. Digital markets are uniquely 
rife with opportunities to engage in this sort of ecosystem building. 
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google, for example, have all made 
substantial expenditures in order to launch personal digital assistants 
(“PDAs”) like Alexa and Siri.75 The competitive goal is to lower the 
amount of cognitive load required by users to navigate everyday 
decisionmaking: “[T]hese firms’ plans make clear they envision a future 
where humans do less thinking when it comes to the small decisions 
 
 69. But see Complaint, United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 
17-2511), 2017 WL 5564815 (challenging a vertical merger). 
 70. See, e.g., Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Advertising Bans and the Substitutability of 
Online and Offline Advertising, 48 J. MARKETING RES. 207 (2011). 
 71. See HMGS, supra note 6, § 5. 
 72. See Kawamoto, supra note 66. 
 73. Analogizing to graph theory, Candeub calls this a “minimum spanning tree.” Candeub, 
supra note 6, at 410. 
 74. Erick Schonfeld, Search Is Google’s Castle, Everything Else Is a Moat, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 
25, 2011), https://techcrunch.com/2011/03/25/search-googles-castle-moat/ [https://perma.cc/FQ2P-
3PGR]. 
 75. Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, Is Your Digital Assistant Devious? 3 (Univ. of Tenn. 
Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 304, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2828117 [https://perma.cc/M8E8-LNJV]. 
       
1510 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:5:1497 
that make up daily life.”76 PDA-based digital ecosystems allow users to 
interact with a firm’s various consumer-facing products more 
seamlessly.77 Yet PDAs can also act as defensive bulwarks around core 
strongholds, further entrenching their creators’ dominant market 
positions.78 
For another example, consider Google’s expansion into the 
mobile operating system (“OS”) market via its acquisition of Android. 
The purchase price, estimated at $50 million, likely allowed the deal to 
escape formal agency antitrust review.79 Even if the deal had triggered 
a review, however, traditional antitrust analysis might well have 
yielded no competitive concerns. Given their different functional 
characteristics, general search results and mobile OSs would likely 
constitute different relevant markets.80 But Google’s acquisition of 
Android proved to be a pivotal step toward building out Google’s 
proprietary ecosystem. In a world of scarce attention, owning a mobile 
OS—even one touted as being “free” to smartphone manufacturers—
has proven quite valuable. Android became the dominant mobile OS 
available for installation on non-Apple smartphones.81 Google was able 
to use its control over mobile OSs to make its own search service the 
default on the vast majority of the world’s smartphones.82 In a world of 
scarce attention, “defaults matter.”83 This is particularly true in digital 
markets.84 
 
 76. Danny Yadron, Google Assistant Takes on Amazon and Apple to Be the Ultimate Digital 
Butler, GUARDIAN (May 18, 2016, 2:17 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technol-
ogy/2016/may/18/google-home-assistant-amazon-echo-apple-siri [https://perma.cc/J84F-42NW]. 
 77. PDAs may also accelerate interbrand substitution, by automating and therefore lowering 
the search and switching costs required for consumers to substitute one seller’s consumer goods 
for another. See Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815 (2019). 
 78. See Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 75, at 4 (“As our personal assistant becomes our default, 
so too will its operating platform’s applications and functions.”). 
 79. In 2005, the relevant Hart-Scott-Rodino Act threshold for reporting deals appears to have 
been $53.1 million. See Wayne Dale Collins & Kenneth S. Prince, Revised HSR Act Thresholds, 
SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP 1, 1 (2005), https://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/News-
Insights/Publications/2005/02/Revised-HSR-Act-Thresholds/Files/Download-PDF-Revised-HSR-
Act-Thresholds/FileAttachment/AT_022005.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4L5-3FEQ]. 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 574 (1966) (finding functional 
differences relevant to product-market definition); Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34, 91 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(similarly relying on different functional characteristics to exclude products from the candidate 
relevant market). 
 81. See Benjamin Edelman, Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bun-
dling?, 11 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 365, 389 (2015) (“Google Android is the dominant mobile OS avail-
able for installation on third-party hardware.”). 
 82. See id. at 390 (“They noted that Google made its own search service the default, and they 
said individual users found it ‘virtually impossible’ to switch.”). 
 83. Id. at 371. 
 84. See Cheng, supra note 64, at 2 (“[E]merging evidence about consumer behavior indicates 
that the role of defaults can apply with particular force in the online sector.”). Self-driving cars 
may present yet another opportunity for digital-focused firms to build out their ecosystems. Google, 
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Many digital-focused firms rely heavily on a strategy of 
acquisitions. But their targets typically compete in separate relevant 
markets, at least as traditional antitrust analysts employ that concept. 
As long as the target does not compete directly against the dominant 
firm’s core business (and even sometimes when the target does so85), 
modern antitrust law has had little to say. Yet private ecosystem 
building carries with it the obvious likelihood of increased entry 
barriers, market concentration, reduced innovation, and assorted other 
welfare harms. 
B. Barriers to Entry 
Having noted the important role played by consumers’ attention 
in digital markets, let us turn now to more traditional entry barriers. 
Many prominent commentators and powerful institutional actors have 
claimed that digital markets are characterized by uniquely low entry 
barriers.86 Multiple U.S. courts have taken this view,87 as have dozens 
of enforcers and legal scholars.88 But, even assuming this claim was 
once correct, is it accurate today? 
 
for example, invested more than $1.1 billion over a six-year period in efforts to develop a self-
driving car. Danielle Muoio, Google Spent at Least $1.1 Billion on Self-Driving Cars Before It Be-
came Waymo, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/google-self-driving-
car-investment-exceeds-1-billion-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/8FUB-AQD9]. Under a traditional anti-
trust analysis, self-driving cars and Google’s core competitive product, general search, would likely 
constitute separate product markets. Even a narrower focus on self-driving cars’ OSs would not 
likely change this outcome. Yet, here again, the opportunity and incentive to engage in ecosystem 
building is readily apparent. Time spent driving is one of the few remaining untapped reserves of 
human attention. The firm that is able to mine such a reserve would gain a substantial competitive 
edge in the race to build out its digital ecosystem. Cf. WU, supra note 42, at 309–10 (analogizing 
the development of smartphones to the way that fracking allowed the recovery of substantial oil 
reserves previously thought to be inaccessible). 
 85. See infra Section II.B (describing Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram and Zillow’s acqui-
sition of Trulia). 
 86. E,g., Posner, supra note 3, at 938: “Because of the extraordinary pace of innova-
tion, . . . the extraordinary amount of capital that is available . . . , and the rapidity with which 
new networks that are primarily electronic can be put into service, the networks that have emerged 
in the new economy do not seem particularly secure against competition.” 
 87. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 416 (E.D. Pa. 2002), 
rev’d, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (“The Internet presents low entry barriers to anyone who wishes to 
provide or distribute information.”); Shea ex rel. Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[T]he Internet presents extremely low entry barriers to those who wish to convey 
Internet content or gain access to it.”); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 877 
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (“[T]he Internet presents very low barriers to entry.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Ilene Knable Gotts & Joseph G. Krauss, Antitrust Review of New Economy Ac-
quisitions, 15 ANTITRUST 59, 59 (2000) (referring to “the low entry barriers in the Internet space”); 
Manne & Wright, supra note 10, at 195 (asserting, as to online search, “that competition really is 
‘just a click away’ for a significant number of users”); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and State 
Sovereignty, 3 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 155, 161 (1997) (“[T]he most important differentiating charac-
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1. Dispelling the Myth of the Garage 
Silicon Valley’s many enthusiastic proponents paint idyllic 
visions of digital markets as incredibly dynamic, susceptible to complete 
creative disruption by a few hackers in a garage. As with most fallacies, 
this one contains a kernel of truth: Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and 
others got their start in actual garages.89 But these firms did not 
develop into giants in their respective garages. Untold billions of dollars 
in sunk costs, acquisitions of direct rivals, leveraging of massive 
proprietary datasets—the story of their growth is the story of 
overcoming (and erecting) staggeringly high barriers to entry. The 
Aluminum Company of America, a monopolist of an earlier time, 
likewise started in a garage.90 Alcoa was nonetheless able to dominate 
a vital industry for decades.91 Humble historical origins do not indicate 
that entry is easy in the present. 
Many of the entry barriers that exist in offline markets are often 
present in digital markets as well. Complex digital products can 
“require years of time, considerable expertise, and hundreds of millions 
of dollars (much of this in the form of sunk costs coupled with 
substantial risk of [loss]) to launch and maintain.”92  
 
teristic of the Internet is its extremely low barriers to entry.”); D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comer-
ford, Antitrust and Regulating Big Data, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129, 1136 (2016) (“Data driven 
markets are typically characterized by low entry barriers . . . .”); Deborah T. Tate, Net Neutrality 
10 Years Later: A Still Unconvinced Commissioner, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 509, 518 (2014) (“The In-
ternet’s low entry costs and lack of barriers to create, upload, start up, and sell goods and services 
are especially beneficial to women and minorities with less access to capital than established 
firms.”); Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More Than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face Recognition 
Privacy in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 165, 189 (2012) (“[T]he Internet offers a plat-
form for projects that require very little capital investment—thus lowering the barriers to entry.”); 
Barriers to Entry, Exit and Mobility, ECONOMIST (July 13, 2009), http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/14025576 [https://perma.cc/8JBU-G222] (“Old ideas about barriers to entry were 
given a new twist with the development of e-commerce. By using the internet, firms can sometimes 
surmount traditional barriers with an ease not previously available.”); Renato Nazzini, Online 
Platforms and Antitrust: Evolution or Revolution?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 1, 4 (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CPI-Nazzini.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FMJ8-MB4M] (“Evidence does indeed suggest that barriers to entry in online 
markets are not necessarily significant.”). 
 89. Drew Hendricks, 6 $25 Billion Companies That Started in a Garage, INC. (July 24, 2014), 
https://www.inc.com/drew-hendricks/6-25-billion-companies-that-started-in-a-garage.html 
[https://perma.cc/KCE8-HZCY] (“Apple is another insanely popular international brand, but few 
people realize that it was started in a California garage by three young men.”). 
 90. Our History, ALCOA, http://www.alcoa.com/global/en/who-we-are/history/default.asp (last 
visited July 28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/M5LH-QDG9] (“Working with his sister Julia in a shed 
attached to the family home in Oberlin, Ohio, chemistry student Charles Martin Hall discovers a 
way to produce aluminum through electrolysis that drastically reduces its cost.”). 
 91. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (discussing Alcoa’s 
monopoly power). 
 92. John M. Newman, The Myth of Free, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 513, 545 (2018). 
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Moreover, the proper focus is not merely on whether some type 
of rudimentary entry can occur. Instead, the question is whether the 
type of entry that would provide a meaningful competitive check on 
dominant firms can occur.93 In many digital markets, such meaningful 
entry is surprisingly difficult. 
Consider, for example, Google Maps, the leading online map 
application. Google developed the present iteration of Maps over a 
period of several years by acquiring several smaller firms at 
considerable cost. These acquisition targets included Waze, a direct 
horizontal rival with access to a unique treasure trove of self-reported 
user data.94 Developing Maps also required creating specially outfitted 
camera cars; collecting more than 21.5 billion megabytes of street-view 
imagery from around the world; employing computer-vision techniques 
to transform satellite and aerial imagery into three-dimensional 
building shapes;95 combining multiple sources of place data to identify 
the locations of bars, restaurants, shops, and even clustered “areas of 
interest”;96 leveraging proprietary user location data to determine how 
busy a given bar or restaurant is in real time;97 and much more. 
In theory, it may be possible for a small team of programmers to 
rapidly develop a rudimentary online mapping service that would 
“compete” with Google Maps. But developing a meaningful constraint 
on Google Maps would be—to put it mildly—no small task. As of 2018, 
Apple had more than $285 billion in cash on hand,98 as well as unique 
access to millions of individuals’ personal data via its own proprietary 
mobile OS. Yet even Apple, with all of its distinct competitive 
advantages, struggled mightily to gain traction against Google Maps. 
 
 93. See HMGS, supra note 6, § 9 (“The prospect of entry into the relevant market will alleviate 
concerns about adverse competitive effects only if such entry will deter or counteract any compet-
itive effects of concern so the merger will not substantially harm customers.”). 
 94. See Rip Empson, WTF Is Waze and Why Did Google Just Pay a Billion+ for It?, 
TECHCRUNCH (June 11, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/06/11/behind-the-maps-whats-in-a-
waze-and-why-did-google-just-pay-a-billion-for-it/ [https://perma.cc/G4MY-NKLS] (“Waze relies 
on its millions of users to act as traffic cops.”). 
 95. Justin O’Beirne, Google Maps’s Moat: How Far Ahead of Apple Maps Is Google Maps?, 
JUSTIN O’BIERNE (2017), https://www.justinobeirne.com/google-maps-moat/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6YF5-5SKG] (providing a multitude of examples in support of Google Map’s superiority to other 
map companies). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Popular Times, Wait Times, and Visit Duration, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/busi-
ness/answer/6263531?hl=en (last visited Sept. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2A9L-75KA]. 
 98. Matt Hunter & Anita Balakrishnan, Apple’s Cash Pile Hits $285.1 Billion, a Record, 
CNBC (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/01/apple-earnings-q1-2018-how-much-
money-does-apple-have.html [https://perma.cc/W93R-NVZ4] (“Apple’s cash reserves hit $285.1 bil-
lion in the quarter ended in December.”). 
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The launch of Apple Maps in 2012 was widely derided as a “debacle.”99 
Four years later, nearly 70% of Apple’s own smartphone users still 
identified Google Maps as their preferred map application.100 
2. Network Effects in Mature Markets 
Network effects often constitute a particularly salient barrier to 
entering digital markets.101 Network effects pose relatively little 
difficulty to first movers. It is subsequent rivals who must offer not only 
a product that is better ceteris paribus, but a product that is so clearly 
better as to outweigh the incumbent’s network advantage. Nonetheless, 
anti-enforcement commentators often downplay the importance of 
network effects by pointing out high-profile examples of disruptive 
entry in networked markets.102 Such arguments overlook or ignore an 
important point: while a given market is still in flux, network effects 
are relatively less powerful. But when the market has matured, they 
become much more salient.103 Landline telephone markets, for example, 
were at first characterized by intense rivalry, but the mature industry 
grew increasingly stagnant under the heavy hand of AT&T.104 
Digital markets offer many modern analogues. These markets 
are often characterized by positive direct and indirect network effects. 
Social networks attract new users by presenting them with the 
opportunity to interact with other users.105 The value of a given network 
to users thus increases along with the size of the network, an example 
 
 99. David Phelan, Are We There Yet—Apple Maps Comes of Age. Oh, Finally, FORBES (May 
14, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidphelan/2017/05/14/are-we-there-yet-apple-maps-
comes-of-age-oh-finally/#1da5360b4550 [https://perma.cc/FS24-94TU]. Characters from the sitcom 
Silicon Valley once mocked a fictional new product by calling it “Apple Maps bad.” Damesh Kwanti, 
Silicon Valley—”It’s Apple Maps Bad”, YOUTUBE (May 18, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=tVq1wgIN62E [https://perma.cc/8ZSZ-SXYE]. 
 100. Greg Sterling, New Survey Says Google Maps Favored by Nearly 70 Percent of iPhone 
Users, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (June 15, 2016), https://searchengineland.com/new-survey-says-
google-maps-favored-nearly-70-percent-iphone-users-251955 [https://perma.cc/7BK2-ZGL2]. 
 101. Stucke and Grunes offer a comprehensive analysis of network effects in data-driven mar-
kets, many of which involve “free” products. STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 17, § 11.06 (discussing 
the way network effects work in companies like Facebook and Whatsapp). Posner was aware of 
this dynamic, but underappreciated its power. See Posner, supra note 3, at 929. 
 102. See infra Section I.D (discussing the myth of constant creative destruction). 
 103. Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1788 
(2012) (“[F]ew network effects exist until that critical mass is achieved and, until then, create little 
value to the network.”).  
 104. See, e.g., Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (reversing 
a Federal Communications Commission decision that had previously upheld AT&T’s right to pre-
vent a small device manufacturer from selling a telephone attachment designed to muffle back-
ground noise). 
 105. Waller, supra note 103, at 1788 (discussing the importance of “a critical mass of users” 
for social media websites). 
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of direct positive network effects.106 Some social networks allow third 
parties to develop compatible applications, thereby introducing the 
possibility of indirect network effects. Online search engines may enjoy 
a type of indirect network effect if “users [do] not consider, when 
deciding whether to run another query, that the results of their query 
and subsequent clicking behavior on suggested links are stored by the 
search engine.”107 Thus, each “next” user benefits from the behavior of 
past users.108 
At the time Posner published his influential essay, many digital 
markets were in their infancy. Today, those markets have matured 
considerably. Network effects can, at any stage of a given market’s 
lifecycle, exert a powerful influence on its direction and performance. In 
mature markets, those effects tend to be stronger still. 
3. The Long Shadow of Digital Giants 
Due in no small part to the entry barriers described above, 
digital giants cast long shadows. Even the mere presence—and 
certainly the activities—of an incumbent like Google or Facebook in a 
given market can hinder entry and stifle innovation. This dynamic may 
not be entirely unique to, but does appear to be particularly acute in, 
digital markets. Yet, perhaps because collecting sufficiently rigorous 
empirical evidence of consumer-welfare harm is difficult in this 
context,109 it has gone largely overlooked. 
The evidence gathered to date suggests that the presence of 
Google or Facebook in a market can hinder innovation in that market. 
Recent empirical work indicates that after Google vertically integrates 
into the market for an app that runs on its Android mobile OS, the 
developers of existing apps in that market reduce their own efforts to 
continue innovating.110 More broadly, angel and seed investment 
 
 106. See STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 17, § 11.09 (“The more users a texting or social net-
work has, the more attractive it becomes to new members looking to connect with them.”). 
 107. Cédric Argenton & Jens Prüfer, Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities, 
8 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 73, 76 (2012). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Kevin Caves & Hal Singer, When the Econometrician Shrugged: Identifying and Plug-
ging Gaps in the Consumer Welfare Standard, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manu-
script at 7), http://georgemasonlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/26-2_CavesSinger-
Web.pdf [ https://perma.cc/MJ6Z-SCQC] (“The empirical evidence that edge innovation has been 
diminished by dominant tech platforms is partially anecdotal and not dispositive but is neverthe-
less consistent with our prior that there is a gap in antitrust enforcement relating to innovation 
harms.”). 
 110. Wen Wen & Feng Zhu, Threat of Platform-Owner Entry and Complementor Responses: 
Evidence from the Mobile App Market, 40 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1336 (2019). The author thanks Hal 
Singer for the central insight, as well as the pointer to Wen and Zhu’s work. 
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activity in the United States has declined since 2015, both in terms of 
overall deal value and (more precipitously) number of deals closed.111 
As market concentration continues to rise, in part due to relatively lax 
antitrust enforcement, start-up rates are declining across all sectors of 
the economy.112 
A particular type of strategic conduct by an incumbent—even if 
legal—can also disincentivize entry and innovation. Dominant digital 
firms are in a unique position to clone, or mimic, small startups’ 
features.113 Over time, such free-riding may dissuade startups from 
even attempting entry. A hypothetical illustrates the problem. Suppose 
a new platform, E, enters the social networking space with hopes of 
attracting users via an attractive, unique feature. If the social 
networking space were characterized by vigorous competition, E might 
stand a good chance of success. Even if an existing rival were to mimic 
E’s feature, E would remain the first mover as to that feature.114 The 
would-be copycat has no unique strategic advantage to exploit, leaving 
E free to compete on the merits. 
But, in the real world, the general social networking space has 
matured and yielded one dominant player, Facebook, Inc. Copycat 
strategies are far more likely to be successful when employed by a 
dominant incumbent with an installed base of over two billion users.115 
The saga of Snapchat, a multimedia messaging app, provides a ready 
example. Noticing the traction Snapchat was gaining among teenage 
 
 111. See MasonLEC, Panel 4: What Are the Goals of Antitrust? What Should They Be?, VIMEO 
(Feb. 19, 2018), https://vimeo.com/256528231 [https://perma.cc/2QM3-4SW5] (remarks of Hal 
Singer at 32:29). 
 112. See JAY SHAMBAUGH ET AL., THE STATE OF COMPETITION AND DYNAMISM: FACTS ABOUT 
CONCENTRATION, START-UPS, AND RELATED POLICIES 9, 19 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/ES_THP_20180611_CompetitionFacts_20180611.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
U48R-3DFE] (“At the same time that markets are becoming more concentrated, they are also be-
coming less dynamic: the number of business start-ups is falling.”). 
 113. See generally Josh Obear, Note, Move Fast and Take Things: Facebook and Predatory 
Copying, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 994, 994 (describing Facebook’s “copycat strategy”). 
 114. On first-mover advantages, see ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, 
MICROECONOMICS 496 (7th ed. 2009) (“In this product-choice game, there is a clear advantage to 
moving first.”). 
 115. See Anita Balakrishnan, 2 Billion People Now Use Facebook Each Month, CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg Says, CNBC (June 27, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/27/how-many-users-does-
facebook-have-2-billion-a-month-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-says.html [https://perma.cc/PA75-MRES]. 
Facebook’s ability to spot nascent rivals—and then neutralize them via acquisition and/or mim-
icry—has likely been accelerated by its growing ability to monitor even non-Facebook-users’ hab-
its. Sarah Perez, Facebook Is Pushing Its Data-Tracking Onavo VPN Within Its Main Mobile App, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 12, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/12/facebook-starts-pushing-its-
data-tracking-onavo-vpn-within-its-main-mobile-app/ [https://perma.cc/RGC3-NUCR]. Onavo (yet 
another Facebook acquisition) offers users a VPN service—yet also allows Facebook to track those 
users’ online activities. Id. Industry analysts pin Facebook’s successful mimicry of tbh, Snapchat, 
and others in part on the Onavo-derived ability to monitor users in real-time, even when they are 
not using Facebook. Id. 
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users, Facebook offered to buy it.116 When that attempt failed, Facebook 
turned instead to mimicking Snapchat’s features.117 Google reportedly 
offered to buy Snapchat as well,118 then similarly pivoted toward 
mimicry.119 Multiple analysts credited these tactics with depressing 
Snapchat’s user growth and share price.120 
Emerging empirical evidence suggests this is not an isolated 
example.121 After surveying dozens of investors and entrepreneurs, one 
technology reporter concluded that Facebook’s free-riding “is having a 
profound impact on innovation in Silicon Valley, by creating a strong 
disincentive for investors and start-ups to put money and effort into 
creating products Facebook might copy.”122 According to a founder, 
Amazon casts a similarly long shadow: “People are not getting funded 
because Amazon might one day compete with them.”123 At a University 
of Chicago panel discussion, venture capitalist Albert Wenger depicted 
the shadows around digital giants like Google, Facebook, and Amazon 
as “Kill Zones,” that is, “areas not worth operating or investing in, since 
defeat is guaranteed.”124 
 
 116. See Olivia Solon, As Tech Companies Get Richer, Is It ‘Game Over’ for Startups?, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/20/tech-startups-fa-
cebook-amazon-google-apple [https://perma.cc/4YB5-8ZGX]. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Alex Heath, Insiders Say Google Was Interested in Buying Snap for At Least $30 Billion 
Last Year, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/google-offered-to-buy-
snapchat-for-at-least-30-in-early-2016-insiders-say-2017-8 [https://perma.cc/7G2M-RW4Q]. 
 119. Todd Spangler, Google Is Reportedly Copying Snapchat’s Discover Feature, VARIETY (Aug. 
4, 2017), https://variety.com/2017/digital/news/google-copying-snapchat-discover-1202516102/ 
[https://perma.cc/A2JF-6MA9] (“Google is working on a project to let publishers package content 
for mobile devices in a way that mimics Snapchat Discover . . . .”). 
 120. E.g., Paul R. La Monica, The Worst May Be Over for Snapchat: Even a Short Seller Likes 
It, CNN MONEY (June 1, 2018, 1:30 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/06/01/investing/snapchat-
stock-citron/index.html [https://perma.cc/A4RG-7L68] (“The biggest complaint that many inves-
tors have is that there’s not much unique about Snapchat. Instagram has copied many of its fea-
tures—and posted stronger user growth as a result.”). 
 121. Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook’s Willingness to Copy Rivals’ Apps Seen as Hurting Innova-
tion, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/facebooks-
willingness-to-copy-rivals-apps-seen-as-hurting-innovation/2017/08/10/ea7188ea-7df6-11e7-a669-
b400c5c7e1cc_story.html [https://perma.cc/QRP9-SN5U]. 
 122. Id.; see also American Tech Giants Are Making Life Tough for Startups, ECONOMIST (June 
2, 2018), https://www.economist.com/business/2018/06/02/american-tech-giants-are-making-life-
tough-for-startups [https://perma.cc/Q88J-R3R2] (“The dominance of the big platforms has had a 
meaningful effect on the entrepreneurial culture of Silicon Valley.”). 
 123. Solon, supra note 116. 
 124. Asher Schecter, Google and Facebook’s ‘Kill Zone’: ‘We’ve Taken the Focus Off of Reward-
ing Genius and Innovation to Rewarding Capital and Scale’, PROMARKET (May 25, 2018), 
https://promarket.org/google-facebooks-kill-zone-weve-taken-focus-off-rewarding-genius-innova-
tion-rewarding-capital-scale/ [https://perma.cc/AL3M-S7GJ]. 
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C. Competition Is More Than “Just a Click Away” 
Nevertheless, anti-enforcement scholars and stakeholders 
contend that digital markets should evade antitrust scrutiny because 
“competition is just [a] click away.”125 The claim is, essentially, that 
demand is extremely elastic in digital markets because low switching 
costs allow customers to substitute easily among competing products.126 
Is competition really “just a click away” in digital markets? As 
with the Myth of the Garage, this platitude turns out to be a half-truth 
at best. In a technical sense, of course, a user can physically click (or 
tap) her way from one search engine, social network, or online retailer 
to the next. But in reality, the cost of that click can be much higher than 
orthodox antitrust analysts have previously imagined. 
If an incumbent has created the lowest-cognitive-load 
ecosystem, a user will find it relatively easy to click from (for example) 
Google’s search engine to Google’s email service to Google’s video-
sharing platform to Google’s map application, and so forth. But those 
are not the “clicks” anti-enforcement commentators invoke to defend 
their pro-defendant position. The sort of click that would matter—away 
from using one search engine and toward using another—entails a level 
of cognitive burden much higher than what is required to simply click 
around within Google’s ecosystem.127 
 
 125. Adam Kovacevich, Google’s Approach to Competition, GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (May 8, 
2009), https://publicpolicy.googleblog.com/2009/05/googles-approach-to-competition.html 
[https://perma.cc/WYP8-4UKD]; e.g., Manne & Wright, supra note 10, at 25 (quoting with approval 
a website’s claim that “as Google so often asserts, . . . competition really is ‘just a click away’ for a 
significant number of users”); see also Jonathan M. Barnett, Thanks to Smart Antitrust, Whole 
Foods Is No Longer ‘Whole Paycheck’, THE HILL (Apr. 8, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/fi-
nance/437775-thank-smart-antitrust-for-your-cheaper-whole-foods-tab [https://perma.cc/8LYT-
98BL] (“Google’s almost 90-percent share of the U.S. search engine market . . . may be a cause for 
concern but only if users cannot easily switch . . . .”). Perhaps unsurprisingly, this argument has 
appeared in articles funded by Google. See, e.g., Manne & Wright, supra note 10, at 171 n.** (ac-
knowledging a grant from the Google-sponsored International Center for Law & Economics). But 
even those making pro-regulatory arguments occasionally reiterate this mantra. See, e.g., Rory 
Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 
1319 (2015) (describing online shopping as “the most seemingly consumer-friendly venue . . . , 
where comparison information is just a click away”). That minor quibble aside, Van Loo’s article 
is an excellent treatment of a neglected topic. 
 126. Pasquale dubs this narrative “[t]he Myth of Easy Platform Switching.” Frank Pasquale, 
When Antitrust Becomes Pro-Trust: The Digital Deformation of U.S. Competition Policy, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRON., 1, 2 (May 2017), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/05/CPI-Pasquale.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QNE-RVQ2]. 
 127. Candeub, supra note 6, at 432 (“The Article does not suggest Google is behaving according 
to System 1. Rather, it is cleverly taking advantage of System 1 behavior of consumers who face 
high search costs.”). 
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Lack of data portability may raise users’ switching costs higher 
still. To illustrate, consider a given social network user.128 At the outset, 
the user makes her choice among the available networks based on a 
range of quality and price considerations.129 But once an individual 
starts to use a particular service, that service becomes a repository for 
her photos, conversations, status updates, contacts, and more.130 Unless 
her data is portable across platforms—and it generally is not131—she 
cannot easily switch to a different social network, even if she would 
otherwise prefer to do so.132 Moreover, because most digital products 
can be improved by personalization based on past user experience, the 
passage of time makes it increasingly difficult for rival networks to offer 
an equally valuable product.133 The argument that “competition is just 
a click away” in digital markets is overly simplistic, bordering on naive. 
An even more fundamental problem becomes apparent when 
this argument is taken to its logical conclusion. Stripped to its essence, 
the argument is that low switching costs indicate that there is no need 
for antitrust oversight. But low switching costs in a market do not 
eliminate the need for antitrust. To illustrate, consider the U.S. market 
for toothpaste, a familiar consumer good. Grocery stores, pharmacies, 
and other retailers typically display multiple branded and generic 
toothpaste varieties in very close proximity to one another, such that 
one variety may be no more than a few inches from another. To 
consumers, then, the cost to switch among varieties is vanishingly low. 
Suppose now that Colgate were to propose a merger with Crest, a deal 
 
 128. On data portability and social networks, see Waller, supra note 103, at 1789 (explaining 
how “sticky” Facebook is with its users). 
 129. See Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Con-
sumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique, 72 MD. L. REV. 335, 338 (2013) (“[U]sers start to 
use one service, such as Facebook, and then find it costly or technically difficult to shift to another 
service, even if they prefer the other service.”). 
 130. See id. at 337–38 (explaining the lack of data portability for companies like Facebook). 
 131. At least in the United States it is not. The European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation provides for some limited rights to data portability. See, e.g., Gabe Maldoff, Top 10 
Operational Impacts of the GDPR: Part 6—RTBF and Data Portability, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROF. 
(Jan. 25, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/top-10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-6-rtbf-and-
data-portability/ [https://perma.cc/7UP6-L96K] (“[T]he right to data portability requires control-
lers to provide personal data to the data subject in a commonly used format and to transfer that 
data to another controller if the data subject so requests.”). 
 132. Swire & Lagos, supra note 129, at 338 (“[U]sers start to use one service, such as Facebook, 
and then find it costly or technically difficult to shift to another service, even if they prefer the 
other service.”). To be clear, the thrust of the present argument is not that antitrust law has never 
confronted high switching costs. It has. See id. at 339 (“The concerns about lock-in and high switch-
ing costs have been extensively addressed in antitrust law.”). The point is instead to identify 
switching costs as a key problem with assuming that users can freely substitute among digital 
products.  
 133. Pasquale, supra note 126, at 3 (discussing user “lock-in” and the obstacles associated with 
switching platforms after years of use). 
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that would give the combined firm more than 75% of the U.S. toothpaste 
market.134 No serious analyst would suggest that enforcers should 
simply turn a blind eye to such a transaction. The same is true of digital 
markets. Even if switching costs were exceedingly low, the potential for 
anticompetitive conduct and effects would remain. 
D. The Vanishing Gale of Creative Destruction 
Despite the fact that digital markets frequently exhibit high 
barriers to entry, skeptics of antitrust enforcement have one card left 
to play: they portray digital markets as nonetheless being characterized 
by intense innovative rivalry.135 As a result, the argument runs, 
antitrust would move too slowly to correct any problems and is 
unnecessary because the relevant markets will quickly correct 
themselves.136 Under this view, the lure of monopoly profits will 
inevitably attract disruptive upstarts seeking to replace dominant 
incumbents—and monopoly is actually good and desirable because it is 
necessary to spur technological progress.137 This unorthodox vision 
traces its roots to Schumpeter’s decades-old invocation of “creative 
destruction,”138 which became a favorite trope among those associated 
with the Austrian and Chicago schools.139 
For empirical support, proponents of this digital creative-
destruction narrative commonly point to Facebook’s “disruption” of 
MySpace and Google’s “disruption” of Yahoo.140 Thus, for example, 
 
 134. See Avalon Jones, Colgate–Palmolive Competitive Analysis, SLIDESHARE (Mar. 1, 2016), 
https://www.slideshare.net/AvalonJones/colgatepalmolive-competitive-analysis 
[https://perma.cc/ETD7-W8YH]. 
 135. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Antitrust as Regulation, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 868 (2012) 
(“[E]nforcement actions against dominant-firm conduct in high-technology markets display unique 
difficulties.”); id. at 869 (“[E]nforcers should err on the side of nonenforcement in situations of 
uncertainty.”); Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1230 
(2002) (concluding that refusals to deal should never give rise to antitrust liability). 
 136. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 
675, 688 (2010) (observing that “some economists in the Schumpeterian tradition doubt whether 
antitrust law does much to advance consumer welfare”). 
 137. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2003) (“The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what at-
tracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and 
economic growth.”). 
 138. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81–87 (3d ed. 
1950, rev. ed. 2008) (describing a process of “creative destruction” and calling it “the essential fact 
about capitalism”).  
 139. Posner, unsurprisingly, is a member of the latter group. See Posner, supra note 3, at 930 
(“The gale of creative destruction that Schumpeter described . . . may be the reality of the new 
economy.”). 
 140. See, e.g., Nicolas Colin, It’s Time for a Real Discussion About Antitrust, FORBES (Oct. 2, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolascolin/2018/10/02/its-time-for-a-real-discussion-about-
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Robert Bork and Gregory Sidak argued that Google should not face 
antitrust liability because “[i]t surpassed Yahoo, just as Yahoo 
surpassed others before it.”141 Put another way, if Facebook and Google 
could supplant their predecessors, they must themselves face the 
constant risk of disruption—their perch at the top is a precarious one. 
Let us pause to revisit these two commonly cited examples of 
digital disruption. It is true that Facebook supplanted MySpace as the 
largest social network—in April 2008.142 That was, to put it rather 
mildly, some time ago.143 Facebook’s reach continuously expanded 
during the following decade. As of 2018, Facebook, Inc. controlled the 
three largest mobile social networking apps in the United States144 and 
boasted a combined user base over five times larger than that of its 
nearest rival.145 With each passing year, the creative-destruction 
narrative becomes ever less credible. 
The Google example fares even worse. Google was already the 
world’s second most popular search provider by 2000.146 That same 
 
antitrust/#7d32cb092086 [https://perma.cc/NPP5-3D54] (“Antitrust doesn’t need to focus on break-
ing up tech firms . . . [because] users are already able to switch to the competition in an instant, 
as they’ve demonstrated many times in the past (remember Yahoo?).”); Nazzini, supra note 88, at 
4 (identifying “Facebook’s success over MySpace in social networks” and “Google’s success over 
Yahoo! and AltaVista in search” as evidence that barriers to entry in digital markets “are not 
necessarily significant”); see also Swire & Lagos, supra note 129, at 358: 
In general, a major theme of innovation theory is the Schumpeterian idea of creative 
destruction. Dynamic competition in the technology space has resulted in ‘successive 
waves of creative destruction.’ For example, MySpace replaced Friendster as the domi-
nant social network, only for Facebook to later usurp MySpace’s position as the market 
leader.  
(footnotes omitted). 
 141. Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, What Does the Chicago School Teach About Internet 
Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 663, 666 (2012). It 
may come as little surprise that their article was funded by Google itself. See id. at 663 (“Google 
commissioned this report, but the views expressed are solely our own.”).  
 142. Michael Arrington, Facebook No Longer the Second Largest Social Network, 
TECHCRUNCH (June 13, 2008), https://techcrunch.com/2008/06/12/facebook-no-longer-the-second-
largest-social-network/ [https://perma.cc/AG68-BUF5]. 
 143. As points of reference, consider that in 2008, Lehman Brothers was still a viable entity 
and Miley Cyrus was able to cause a controversy by baring her shoulders on the cover of Vanity 
Fair. How naïve we were. See generally Brittany Spanos, Miley Cyrus’ 10 Biggest Scandals, 
ROLLING STONE (May 8, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/miley-cyrus-10-biggest-
scandals-w481179 [https://perma.cc/PTC3-N7JM] (collecting some of Cyrus’ more memorable mo-
ments of negative publicity). 
 144. Most Popular Mobile Social Networking Apps in the United States as of February 2018 by 
Monthly Users (in Millions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/248074/most-popular-
us-social-networking-apps-ranked-by-audience/ (last visited June 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
943K-KRDM]. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Tom Hormby, The Rise of Google: Beating Yahoo at Its Own Game, LOW END MAC (Aug. 
15, 2013), http://lowendmac.com/2013/the-rise-of-google-beating-yahoo-at-its-own-game/ [https:// 
perma.cc/N28Y-9LMU]. Google was already the largest search engine in terms of pages indexed. 
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year, Yahoo (previously the most popular provider) announced that 
Google would begin serving as the search engine for Yahoo’s web 
portal,147 effectively making Google the dominant global search 
provider.148 As with Facebook, Google’s stranglehold over search only 
increased with the passage of time—as of 2018, after nearly two decades 
of dominance, Google still controlled more than 90% of the global 
market for general search results.149  
The anecdotes of MySpace and Yahoo, still commonly cited by 
those who argue that digital markets are epicenters of creative 
destruction,150 look increasingly creaky with age. The relevant markets 
have been characterized not by the “gale” of creative destruction 
described by Schumpeter, but by entrenched and unchecked 
dominance. It is high time to abandon the “romantic but naïve 
Schumpeterian [notion] that giant” monopolists and concentrated 
oligopolies are necessary for technological progress.151 In fact, a more 
sophisticated reading of Schumpeter suggests that he was not nearly so 
opposed to government intervention—particularly in the form of 
antitrust enforcement—as his modern-day adherents tend to be.152 An 
antitrust enterprise that somehow came to view monopoly as good and 
necessary has rather clearly lost its way.153  
Durable market power is the precise evil antitrust laws are 
meant to prevent. Far from being self-correcting, digital markets often 
facilitate such power. This suggests that the orthodox position rests in 
 
See Google Launches World’s Largest Search Engine, GOOGLE NEWS (June 26, 2000) http://goog-
lepress.blogspot.com/2000/06/google-launches-worlds-largest-search.html [https://perma.cc/PVV8-
XQKR]. 
 147. Yahoo! Selects Google as Its Default Search Engine Provider, GOOGLE NEWS (June 16, 
2000) http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2000/06/yahoo-selects-google-as-its-default.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8BF5-P7BX]. 
 148. It is worth noting that at the time, network effects and the importance of scale were less 
salient, because search engines’ indexing functions did not yet incorporate data on users’ behavior. 
See Case AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping), 2017 E.C. 1/2003, ¶ 290, http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U7T-CTSA] [here-
inafter Google Search (Shopping)]. 
 149. Search Engine Market Share Worldwide: May 2017-May 2018, STATCOUNTER 
http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share (last visited June 15, 2019) [https:// 
perma.cc/QH48-XLMY]. 
 150. See Posner, supra note 3, at 930 (“The gale of creative destruction that Schumpeter de-
scribed . . . may be the reality of the new economy.”). 
 151. F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1014 (1987). 
 152. See Waller, supra note 103, at 1802–03 (Schumpeter himself did not advocate the com-
plete absence of a government role in the formulation of competition policy). That alternate reading 
inevitably invites speculation about an alternate world that might have been, a world in which 
Instagram, Messenger, WhatsApp, YouTube, Android, Waze, and a host of others has continued 
to flourish instead of being snapped up by Facebook and Google. 
 153. See Pasquale, supra note 126, at 1–2 (describing the FTC’s “curious turn toward trying to 
help Google and other massive digital platforms to consolidate market power, rather than policing 
them”). 
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part upon a flawed assumption about the balance of error costs in this 
context. The societal cost from false negatives is substantially higher 
than pro-defendant analysts have previously assumed. Normatively, 
this militates in favor of an invigorated approach to digital markets. 
II. UNIQUE ANTICOMPETITIVE STRATEGIES 
Digital markets are susceptible to at least two (and likely many 
more) unique anticompetitive strategies. These are referred to herein 
as “no escape” and “split-the-rents.”154 To date, these strategies have 
gone unnoticed, or at least unremedied, by the antitrust enterprise. 
This failure suggests that the consensus view regarding the balance of 
error costs in this context rests on yet another flawed assumption. The 
likelihood of false negatives occurring is higher than previously 
imagined. 
Moreover, at least two types of anticompetitive conduct are—
although not strictly exclusive to the digital context—relatively more 
viable and therefore likely to occur in digital markets. These include 
product redesign and what is referred to herein as “digital blackmail.”155 
The attractiveness of these anticompetitive strategies further tips the 
balance away from the pro-defendant stance preferred by proponents of 
the status quo.  
A. “No Escape” 
When a dominant firm gains control of multiple platforms, and 
users frequently engage with two or more of those platforms 
concurrently, the dominant firm may be able to impose “no-escape” 
harm. Consider, for example, digital social networks. It is not 
uncommon for individuals to concurrently use multiple, differentiated 
social networking platforms, a practice known as “multihoming.”156 
Suppose firm A owns and operates a popular social network. Rival social 
networks impose at least some competitive constraints on the attention 
costs A can charge its users. If A attempts to display too many (or overly 
intrusive) advertisements to its users, its users will respond by 
spending more time on rival networks. This substitution (or the threat 
 
 154. See infra Sections II.A–B. 
 155. See infra Sections II.C–D. 
 156. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 
J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990, 991–92 (2003) (“In a number of markets, a fraction of end users on one 
or the two sides connect to several platforms. Using the Internet terminology, we will say that they 
‘multihome.’ ”). 
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thereof) will to some extent discipline A’s ability to raise attention costs 
above a competitive level. 
Continuing the example, suppose further that A proposes to 
acquire its biggest rival, B. If the two networks are differentiated 
enough, an antitrust enforcer applying the traditional market-
definition toolkit may conclude that they operate in different relevant 
markets.157 As a result, the analyst would likely conclude that the 
proposed acquisition poses little to no likelihood of harming 
competition, or that, in any event, litigation would be too risky to 
pursue.158 
But might such an acquisition harm users’ welfare?159 With B no 
longer acting as a distinct competitive force, the merged firm would face 
lessened constraints on its ability to extract users’ attention. Control of 
multiple differentiated platforms can prevent multihoming users from 
escaping a targeted advertising strategy. The merged firm could 
exercise its newfound power in at least two ways, one relatively familiar 
to the antitrust enterprise, the second less so.  
First, the merged firm could simply raise the attention costs of 
using A by increasing advertising load on that platform. Some users will 
switch to B in response; the merged firm thus recovers some of the 
diverted users. If the diversion ratio is high enough, and repositioning 
or entry are unlikely enough, the cost increase will be profitable.160 This 
possible avenue of anticompetitive harm is relatively familiar to 
analysts. The HMGs, for example, contemplate using diversion ratios 
to assess price effects in differentiated-product contexts.161 That said, it 
is worth noting that the lack of obvious prices in many digital markets 
may complicate matters considerably. The HMGs explicitly focus on 
 
 157. See HMGS, supra note 6, § 4.1.1 (describing the hypothetical-monopolist test commonly 
used by the Agencies to define relevant markets). 
 158. Merger analysis in differentiated-product markets is relatively (though not entirely) un-
familiar ground for antitrust enforcers. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Prod-
ucts, ANTITRUST 23 (Spring 1996), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0334/1cb7a9d50bbb2d6aa 
396106e0f9123cbe665.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUT8-DELQ] (“For homogeneous products, the tradi-
tional structural approach of defining markets and measuring market shares and market concen-
tration has deep roots, along with a rich empirical tradition linking market structure to perfor-
mance. . . . This traditional structural approach towards merger policy . . . dates back to the 
1960s . . . .”). 
 159. Here, the term “welfare” is used in a broad sense to mean something like “well-being,” 
rather than as a signifier for the illogical and impractical concept that term generally represents 
in orthodox antitrust discourse. For a thorough unpacking of the problematic nature of “welfare” 
as used in the latter sense, see Glick, supra note 25.  
 160. See Shapiro, supra note 158, at 24. 
 161. HMGS, supra note 6, § 6.1 (“[T]he Agencies may seek to quantify the extent of direct com-
petition between a product sold by one merging firm and a second product sold by the other merg-
ing firm by estimating the diversion ratio from the first product to the second product.”). 
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“price effects.”162 The formulas used to calculate diversion ratios require 
quantification, which is relatively difficult in zero-price markets.163 Of 
course, not all digital markets are zero-price markets, but the two 
categories overlap considerably. Thus, even this familiar type of harm 
may be relatively difficult to analyze (and, if necessary, prove during 
litigation) using traditional econometric tools. 
The second, more complex, way for the merged firm to exercise 
its power involves cross-platform targeted advertising. Humans’ ability 
to make optimal decisions can be depleted over time.164 Thus, 
repeatedly targeting a particular advertisement to a particular user 
may be more persuasive (and less informative) than an isolated 
exposure.165 Repeated targeting can be viewed, then, as a form of 
increased attention cost. To illustrate how this can become a 
competitive concern, consider Facebook’s many acquisitions of rival 
social platforms and related technologies. In 2016, Sheryl Sandberg, 
Facebook’s Chief Operating Officer, boasted to investors that “all of 
these platforms together really help . . . us . . . use the 
targeting . . . capabilities we’ve invested in across multiple 
platforms.”166 Sandberg went on to explain how Facebook allowed an 
advertising client, Garmin, to target Facebook’s users across its various 
platforms:  
[Garmin] targeted outdoor enthusiasts, then retargeted people who viewed the Instagram 
videos with carousel ads on Facebook . . . . Then they extended those ads on Audience 
Network . . . . That’s a really good example of how you can take targeting and the ability 
 
 162. See id.  
 163. See generally Newman, Applications, supra note 15 (discussing various approaches and 
effects to zero-price markets).  
 164. In psychology literature, “ego depletion” describes the theory, supported by empirical ev-
idence, that exercising willpower eventually exhausts our supply, rendering us more likely to make 
suboptimal choices. For the seminal article, see Roy F. Baumeister et al., Ego Depletion: Is the 
Active Self a Limited Resource?, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1252 (1998). Closely related 
is the concept of “decision fatigue,” which holds that the very act of making decisions can, over 
time, reduce the quality of the decisions being made. See, e.g., John Tierney, Do You Suffer from 
Decision Fatigue?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 17, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/maga-
zine/do-you-suffer-from-decision-fatigue.html [https://perma.cc/K6UZ-4EJW]. 
 165. It is worth noting that the traditional defense of advertisements—that they function pri-
marily to provide consumers with important information—looks increasingly shaky in the infor-
mation age. In fact, one scholar provocatively calls for a return to antitrust scrutiny of commercial 
advertising on the grounds that advertising’s supposed information-delivering function has be-
come obsolete in the digital era, leaving only anticompetitive effects to explain the continued prev-
alence of advertisements. See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Obsolescence of Advertising in the Infor-
mation Age, 127 YALE L.J. 1270, 1278 (2018) (“Advertising is anticompetitive relative to that world, 
because advertising differentiates the advertised product from those of competitors.”). 
 166. Second Quarter 2016 Results Conference Call, FACEBOOK, INC., 1, 18 (July 27, 2016), 
https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2016/q2/FB-Q216-Earnings-Transcript.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8JAZ-RAEC]. 
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to target across Audience Network, Facebook, and Instagram and drive people all the way 
down the funnel . . . .167 
This statement illustrates, rather vividly, the possibility of harm that 
can occur when users can no longer escape the reach of a dominant 
platform and are instead driven “down the funnel.”168  
This “no escape” harm is different from the more traditional type 
of harm that diversion-ratio analysis is meant to address. Suppose Coke 
were to merge with Pepsi. The traditional problem would arise if the 
merged firm could profitably raise the price of Coke because most 
buyers would switch to Pepsi instead of rival products. No-escape harm 
from cross-platform targeted advertising, however, is what would 
happen if the merged firm could somehow degrade buyers’ ability to 
make optimal decisions regarding cola consumption, then raise the 
price of both Coke and Pepsi as a result. 
Digital markets appear rife with opportunities for no-escape 
harm to occur. Antitrust authorities, however, have largely turned a 
blind eye. Facebook was cleared to acquire Instagram without 
conditions in 2012,169 WhatsApp with minor conditions in 2014,170 
messaging-app tbh without conditions in 2017,171 and dozens more 
companies whose products were either substitutes for or complements 
to Facebook’s core social network.172 Even under traditional antitrust 
analysis, some of these acquisitions should have raised eyebrows.173 
When the possibility of no-escape harm is factored in, their clearance 
becomes yet more worrisome. 
 
 167. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
 168. In advertising-speak, driving a user “down the funnel” means driving her closer and closer 
to a purchase decision. See, e.g., Justas Markus, Conversion Funnel, OBERLO (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.oberlo.com/ecommerce-wiki/conversion-funnel [https://perma.cc/4AEA-6UPF]. 
 169. Alexei Oreskovic, FTC Clears Facebook’s Acquisition of Instagram, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 
2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-instagram/ftc-clears-facebooks-acquisition-of-
instagram-idUSBRE87L14W20120823 [https://perma.cc/FUH7-8E92]. 
 170. Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook Says WhatsApp Deal Cleared by FTC, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 
2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-whatsapp/facebook-says-whatsapp-deal-
cleared-by-ftc-idUSBREA391VA20140410 [https://perma.cc/2C8T-XRML]. 
 171. See Sara Ashley O’Brien, Facebook Acquires Beloved Teen App ‘tbh’, CNN (Oct. 16, 2017), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/16/technology/business/facebook-tbh/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/K8WN-MRTR]. 
 172. See generally Steve Toth, 66 Facebook Acquisitions—The Complete List (2018), 
TECHWYSE (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.techwyse.com/blog/infographics/facebook-acquisitions-the-
complete-list-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/2PJG-DF83]. 
 173. Although they involved modern markets and digital technology, these deals nonetheless 
combined direct horizontal competitors. And horizontal mergers are traditionally viewed as par-
ticularly likely to yield anticompetitive effects. 
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B. “Split the Rents” 
When a digital-product provider attains a dominant position in 
its own market, it may be able to steer its users to a favored 
counterparty operating in a different market. If such steering causes 
consolidation of that distinct market, the dominant firm and its favored 
counterparty may be able to share in the resulting rents. This ability to 
split the rents from a different market would make the steering 
strategy rational for the platform. 
Many digital markets feature a relatively simple business model 
that entails bringing together advertisers and users.174 Online 
publishers, for example, attract readers with content and advertisers 
with access to those readers. Such firms supply two distinct products to 
two distinct customer groups: content to readers (in exchange for 
readers’ attention) and readers’ attention to advertisers (in exchange 
for monetary payments).175 Antitrust doctrine is certainly still 
developing in this area,176 but it is relatively comfortable with some of 
the simple types of harm that can occur in advertising-supported 
markets. For example, a dominant provider might increase attention 
costs to readers, increase prices to advertisers, or both.177 
Other business models, however, are more complex. General 
search providers (like Google) similarly bring together advertisers and 
users—but also indirectly bring together sellers and buyers of other 
products. Thus, for example, a search user might search for “local 
restaurants” and be shown a display ad next to the search results. But 
that search user is likely also seeking to engage in an offline 
transaction: the purchase of a meal from a restaurant. The search 
provider facilitates this offline transaction, though the latter occurs in 
a market distinct from the provider’s core business.  
A unique risk of harm arises when the offline counterparty to 
consumers assumes a dualistic role: when it begins to function also as 
an advertising counterparty to the search provider. Continuing the 
above example, this would occur if local restaurants were to begin 
paying the search provider for access to its users’ attention. Such 
 
 174. The economics and business literature refers to such markets as “two-sided.” See, e.g., 
Rochet & Tirole, supra note 156, at 991. 
 175. See generally, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 52, at 45 (“[P]roviders like television networks 
and Internet search engines operate in markets with two sets of customers, the viewers or users 
whom they attract by providing information for free and the advertisers that pay to reach those 
viewers and users.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2277 (2018) (taking up fundamental 
questions relating to market definition and power in a two-sided context). 
 177. Newman, Applications, supra note 15, at 67 (“Firms in zero-price markets often make 
their profits by extracting information, attention, or both.”). 
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restaurants would act as counterparties to consumers and as 
counterparties to the search provider. 
A search provider could, of course, simply provide “neutral” 
search results to its users. But it could also extract payment from 
advertisers in exchange for a more favored spot in the results,178 alter a 
“reputational system” to favor certain advertisers,179 or otherwise tilt 
the offline playing field by “steering” users toward favored 
advertisers.180 The ultimate effect is foreclosure of non-favored sellers 
from—and increasing concentration in—the offline market. In other 
words, digital steering is likely to cause consolidation of markets that 
appear to be distinct from the core digital market(s). The resulting 
rents, if split between the dominant provider and its favored 
counterparties, make the scheme rational.  
Traditional antitrust analysis could easily overlook the 
possibility of such harm. To illustrate how this type of false negative 
might occur, suppose two search providers propose to merge. The 
relevant market(s) would not likely include local restaurant markets 
and the like, because neither of the merging parties would be treated 
as a direct market participant in such markets. As a result, traditional 
analysts would presumably ignore the possibility of split-the-rents 
harm.181 
The acquisition of digital real estate portal Trulia by its direct 
rival, Zillow, provides a possible real-world illustration of such harm 
occurring due to a false negative on the part of an enforcement agency. 
In 2014, Zillow and Trulia announced plans to combine into Zillow 
Group (“ZG”). “At the time, the two firms were the largest and second-
largest online real-estate portals, respectively.”182 After conducting a 
pre-merger review, the FTC cleared the deal without condition.183 
During a subsequent earnings call, ZG’s Chief Executive Officer, 
Spencer Rascoff, announced that “Zillow Group represented greater 
than 67 percent of the total online real estate category . . . and 78 
 
 178. See Google Search (Shopping), supra note 148, ¶ 25. 
 179. Newman, supra note 26, at 5.  
 180. See, e.g., Complaint at 24–27, EJ MGT LLC v. Zillow Grp., Inc., No. 18-584 (JMV) (JBC), 
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32420 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2019) [hereinafter Complaint, EJ MGT LLC] (alleg-
ing that Zillow disrupts competition in realtor markets by extracting payments from “favored” 
realtors in exchange for disabling the “Zestimate” feature of Zillow’s online real estate portal). To 
the extent it is relevant, the author consulted the plaintiff regarding this litigation. The views 
expressed herein are those of the author only and do not reveal or draw on any confidential infor-
mation. 
 181. See, e.g., HMGS, supra note 6, § 7.1 (addressing solely the possibility of harm to the “rel-
evant market” in which the parties are “market participants”). 
 182. Newman, supra note 26, at 5. 
183. Id. 
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percent of the category on mobile only.”184 Those market shares would 
likely be enough to warrant a presumption under U.S. antitrust law 
that ZG possesses monopoly power185 and would almost certainly have 
made the proposed deal presumptively anticompetitive ex ante.186 By 
its own admission, then, ZG appeared to have gained a dominant 
market position. 
Additional statements from ZG executives suggest a subsequent 
shift in strategy to steer users toward “Premier” real estate agent-
advertisers and away from non-Premier agents. As Rascoff put it, “[W]e 
will continue to encourage lower performing agents to leave”187 while 
helping Premier agents “grow their market share in their respective 
cities.”188 More specifically, ZG’s strategy was intended to have the 
effect of “accelerating the larger trend across the real estate agent 
population of higher producing agents gaining market share from those 
who are less competitive.”189 Suppose that ZG’s strategy had its 
intended effect of increasing concentration in offline real estate agent 
markets. For this strategy to be rational, ZG would need a means of 
splitting the resulting rents with its favored realtors. As it turns out, 
the “Premier” agents that benefit from ZG’s steering appear to be those 
who pay fees to ZG.190 These payments could be viewed as a mechanism 
for splitting the rents between realtors and ZG.  
 
 184. Prepared Remarks at the Q2 2016 Earnings Conference Call, ZILLOW GROUP, INC. (Aug. 
4, 2016) [hereinafter Zillow Q2 2016 Earnings Remarks], https://s1.q4cdn.com/ 
623891520/files/doc_financials/quarterly/2016/q2/2Q16PreparedRemarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
S77K-VYZA]; see also Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1293–94 
(2017) (“After purchasing its leading competitor Trulia, online real estate listing service Zillow 
reached a 63 percent share.”). 
 185. Cf., e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Dentsply 
has long dominated the industry . . . and enjoys a 75–80% market share on a revenue basis, [and] 
67% on a unit basis . . . .”). 
 186. Using the 67% figure as a conservative estimate and assigning equal shares to each of 
the pre-merged firms (the most conservative way to calculate), the parties’ pre-merger shares alone 
would yield an HHI of 2,244.5. Adding the other market participants’ shares would almost cer-
tainly cause the pre-merger market’s HHI to exceed 2,500, the threshold for a market to be con-
sidered “highly concentrated” under the HMGs. See HMGS, supra note 6, § 5.3. 
 187. Prepared Remarks at the Q3 2015 Earnings Conference Call (Nov. 3, 2015), 
https://s1.q4cdn.com/623891520/files/doc_financials/quarterly/2015/q3/Zillow_Group_Q3_2015_ 
Prepared_Remarks.FINAL.110315.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT6E-DAGV]. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Zillow Q2 2016 Earnings Remarks, supra note 184, at 6.  
 190. See, e.g., Zillow Premier Agent Frequently Asked Questions, ZILLOW PREMIER AGENT, 
https://www.zillow.com/advertising/frequently-asked-questions.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/Y7GM-S7TT]:  
Why should I advertise on Zillow Group? . . . Receive instant visibility through the 
brands and devices potential clients love to use, like Zillow, Trulia and StreetEasy. . . . 
With the Buyers Agent List, you’ll appear next to listings and home searches in your 
target area as an elite agent to contact. Home buyers interested in taking the next step 
in their real estate purchase can connect with you directly through the touch of a button. 
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The likelihood of split-the-rents harm occurring will, of course, 
vary on a case-by-case basis. But it will presumably increase along with 
the size of the potential rents. Where the target market is highly 
competitive (as is arguably the case with, for example, some local 
restaurant markets), the attractiveness of a split-the-rents steering 
strategy may be relatively low. But where the target market is 
protected by some barriers to entry (as is arguably the case with local 
real estate agent markets191), this strategy becomes increasingly 
attractive.  
Split-the-rents harm is uniquely facilitated by the attributes of 
digital markets. The same features that drive users to digital portals 
also render users uniquely susceptible to this type of steering.192 In fact, 
there are some parallels to the European Commission’s Google Search 
(Shopping) decision. The Commission’s basic theory of harm was that 
Google used its dominant general search engine to steer users toward 
its own comparison-shopping service, leveraging its power over general 
search to increase its power over comparison shopping.193 Users access 
portals like Google, Zillow, and the like as a means of cutting through 
the fog of information overload, which is felt most acutely in digital 
contexts.194 It is this unique backdrop that makes users particularly 
vulnerable to steering—and makes steering strategies more 
attractive—in digital markets.195 When steering crosses the line into 
outright deception, it may violate consumer-protection laws. But if and 
when it is used to facilitate market consolidation, it is an antitrust 
problem. 
 
 191. Real estate agents typically are protected by occupational-licensing barriers to entry. See, 
e.g., 3 Steps to Becoming a Real Estate Agent, REAL ESTATE EXPRESS, https://www.realestateex-
press.com/real-estate-license/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2019) [https://perma.cc/VB59-Z8A9] (“No mat-
ter what state you live in, you must take the real estate pre-licensing course from an accredited 
real estate licensing school.”). 
 192. Cf. Cheng, supra note 64, at 2–3 (observing that “default” status exerts a much more 
powerful sway over consumers in digital contexts than in brick-and-mortar stores). 
 193. Google Search (Shopping), supra note 148, ¶ 593 (concluding that Google’s conduct was 
“capable of leading competing comparison shopping services to cease providing their services,” al-
lowing Google to impose higher costs on merchants). Split-the-rents harm is conceptually similar 
to this more straightforward leveraging theory of harm, but it is more likely to fall under the radar. 
On digital leveraging strategies, see Khan, supra note 52, at 328. 
 194. See David Bawden & Lyn Robinson, The Dark Side of Information: Overload, Anxiety and 
Other Paradoxes and Pathologies, 35 J. INFO. SCI. 180, 184 (2009) (“Innovations in information 
technology, such as the printed book, the periodical magazine or journal, the abstracting journal 
and the computer, have all led to complaints that it is impossible to keep up with the amount of 
information available.”). 
 195. See Cheng, supra note 64, at 3 (“[F]irms already embrace this idea; they collect data on 
consumer behavior precisely to steer consumer purchasing decisions.”). 
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C. Digital Product (Re)design 
Anticompetitive product design (and redesign) is a relatively 
well-accepted theory of antitrust harm.196 The archetypical design-
conduct claim alleges that a dominant firm redesigned its core product 
so as to favor its own complementary product197 and/or disfavor rivals’ 
products.198 Such design- and redesign-related strategies have spawned 
a rich body of antitrust precedent.199 For a variety of reasons, leading 
cases and scholars advocate for heavily pro-defendant rules in this 
area.200 But, as the following discussion demonstrates, their arguments 
are inapposite in digital markets. Instead, several unique 
characteristics make digital markets an ideal context in which to deploy 
anticompetitive product design strategies. 
Plaintiffs have brought multiple cases alleging anticompetitive 
product design in digital markets. Microsoft III was the earliest—and 
remains the most prominent—of these.201 There, a dominant firm 
(Microsoft) issued a new version of its core product (the Windows 
 
 196. See e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 776a (“A dominant firm may alter its 
product to the detriment of smaller rivals, particularly those making complementary products.”). 
 197. See John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 681, 683 (2012). This strategy effectively forces customers to use both of the dominant 
firm’s products. Because of the conceptual similarity to contractual tying, this type of conduct is 
sometimes called “technological tying.” See, e.g., Charles M. Gastle & Susan Boughs, Microsoft III 
and the Metes and Bounds of Software Design and Technological Tying Doctrine, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
7 (2001). 
 198. See Thibault Schrepel, Predatory Innovation: The Definite Need for Legal Recognition, 21 
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 19, 46–50 (2017) (usefully distinguishing between platform-design de-
cisions (open or closed) and product modification so as to reduce interoperability with rivals’ prod-
ucts). 
 199. Newman, supra note 197, at 715 (collecting and summarizing leading cases). There is 
growing recognition of “product hopping” as a discrete theory of liability. While such claims hinge 
on design-related strategies, they are not archetypical “product design” antitrust claims as that 
term is generally employed in the literature and case law. For a thorough discussion of product-
hopping, see Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (2016). 
 200. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 286 (2d Cir. 1979) (hold-
ing that a design is procompetitive so long as there is some evidence that the design represented 
a product improvement, along with evidence that customers preferred the new design); ILC Pe-
ripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (holding that if expert 
testimony so much as differs on whether a given design is pro- or anticompetitive, the design is 
irrebuttably presumed to be procompetitive and legal); Lisa P. Goldstein et al., Antitrust in High-
Tech Industries, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1071, 1094 (2012) (“[Professor Daniel Crane] said he would 
advocate something like a business judgment rule [for Google’s search-related practices] . . . [and] 
discouraged an ex post balancing of the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects because the 
marketplace changes too quickly to analyze these things.”). 
 201. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d 34, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“United States and individual states 
brought antitrust action against manufacturer of personal computer operating system and Inter-
net web browser.”). The literature on Microsoft III is exceedingly voluminous. For a thorough treat-
ment, see WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE (2007). 
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operating system) that was designed so as to maximize interoperability 
with its own complementary product (Internet Explorer) and minimize 
interoperability with a rival’s product (Netscape Navigator, a 
competing web browser).202 The plaintiffs’ allegations in In re Apple 
iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, if taken as true, provide another 
example.203 According to the complaint, Apple issued software updates 
to a core product (iPods) that were designed to block interoperability 
with a rival’s product (RealNetworks’ low-price music files).204 
The modern antitrust enterprise employs a relatively laissez-
faire approach to conduct involving product design. Some go so far as to 
argue that courts and enforcement agencies should treat all product-
design strategies as per se legal.205 Proponents of such extreme 
positions argue that product design is uniquely unattractive as an 
exclusionary strategy. In brick-and-mortar markets, theorists posit 
that “product innovation is extremely costly and time consuming to 
develop, design, manufacture, and place on the market”206 and that 
product redesigns done purely to disfavor rival products would likely 
prompt a negative customer reaction.207 If the would-be monopolist 
were thereby forced to reverse course, it would forfeit any sunk costs 
invested and perhaps incur additional reversal costs by switching back 
to its former product design.208 As a result, anticompetitive product 
design was thought to be quite rare. 
But unique characteristics of digital markets challenge the 
assumptions underlying that defendant-friendly position. To 
conceptualize the decision facing a dominant firm, assume that Cd 
represents the cost of undertaking an anticompetitive design strategy, 
 
 202. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 58, 59–78 (describing how Microsoft systematically “reduc[ed] 
[the] usage share of Netscape’s browser and, hence, protect[ed] [its] operating system monopoly.”). 
 203. See Amended Complaint at 1, In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., 796 F. Supp. 2d 
1137 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. C 05-00037 JW), 2010 WL 10934546 ¶ 7 (“[W]hen Apple launched the 
iTunes Music Store (“iTS”) in 2003, it quietly changed course, restricting iTS and iTunes to work 
only with its own portable digital media player, the iPod, and restricting the iPod so it could only 
play files embedded with Apple’s own proprietary Digital Rights Management.”).  
 204. Id. at 26, 2010 WL 10934546 ¶ 132 (“Defendant took anticompetitive action against Re-
alNetworks, with the express purpose of ensuring that only Audio Downloads from iTS would be 
playable on iPods, and not on its competitors’ Portable Digital Media Players.”). 
 205. See Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 
1148 (1983) (“Courts should advance from their strong presumptions of legality for technological 
tie-ins and acknowledge that marketing strategies for product innovations should be per se legal.”). 
 206. 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 775c, at 284 (3d ed. 
2006). 
 207. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 274–76 
(2005) (“Incompatibility can be expected to produce customer resistance, particularly if the rede-
signed good is no better than the old one.”). 
 208. Newman, supra note 197, at 703 (“And there are “sunk” costs associated with innovation, 
costs that cannot be recovered once invested.”). 
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Pm represents the potential monopoly profit to be had if the strategy 
succeeds, L represents the losses that will be sustained if the strategy 
fails, and R represents the risk (expressed as a ratio) that the strategy 
will fail due to customer backlash or antitrust oversight. The orthodox 
position is that the cost of such strategies typically outweighs the 
potential profits discounted for the risk of loss, such that 
 
Cd > Pm – LR 
 
Digital products alter this calculus. Redesigning code-based 
products, often done through issuing updates to existing software or 
altering HTML or algorithms, can generally be accomplished at far 
lower cost than redesigning physical products. Consider the products at 
issue in some of the seminal product-design cases: cameras and film,209 
desktop computers and hardware accessories,210 a skin-graft gun and 
needles.211 Each of these redesigns likely required a team of engineers, 
changes to production facilities, substantial marketing costs, and 
more.212 A software update, however, can be created by a single 
programmer or small team working at their desks (or even at home).213 
Moreover, digital distribution is generally much less costly than offline 
distribution.214 Thus, Cd will often be lower in digital markets. 
On the other side of the scale, monopoly profits are often higher 
in digital markets. As the leading treatise recognizes, strategically 
designed incompatibility can cause “serious anticompetitive 
consequences, particularly in ‘network’ industries where compatibility 
itself is often an essential ingredient to product success.”215 This is so 
because the resulting monopoly power is uniquely durable. As noted 
 
 209. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 268–71 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing 
various aspects of the camera and film industry). 
 210. In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 972–73 (N.D. Cal. 
1979) (“IBM is a supplier of computer systems, supplying all, or nearly all of the user’s computing 
needs. It offers a wide range of services and products, both software and hardware.”), aff’d sub 
nom. Transamerica Comput. Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 211. C.R. Bard., Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1346–48 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Bard sued M3 
Systems in August 1993 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
asserting that M3’s ProMag biopsy gun and ACN/SACN biopsy needle assemblies infringed the 
’308 and ‘056 patents, respectively.”). 
 212. Newman, supra note 197, at 706 (“Like the initial distribution of software, updating soft-
ware was once a costly, time-intensive project. It generally required design and subsequent distri-
bution of code-based program files on physical disks to consumers.”). 
 213. Cf. PETER SEIBEL, CODERS AT WORK: REFLECTIONS ON THE CRAFT OF PROGRAMMING 154–
56 (2009) (discussing writing and rewriting computer code). 
 214. Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257, 2287–88 (2010) 
(“Digital technologies reduced the costs for individual creation and distribution.”). 
 215. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 776a. 
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above, many digital markets exhibit network tendencies.216 In such 
contexts, Pm is relatively high, making anticompetitive product design 
relatively more attractive. 
Finally, both the amount and the likelihood of losses are 
relatively low for digital-product design strategies. The sunk costs 
entailed by undertaking the strategic conduct are usually lower, which 
means that the losses from an unsuccessful design or redesign will be 
lower. Second, digital redesigns are generally less costly to reverse than 
physical-product redesigns, further lowering L. Third, lower Cd means 
that the firm can charge less for the redesigned product, which reduces 
the risk (R) of a negative customer reaction.217 Finally, customers are 
often required to spend relatively minimal amounts of time “accepting” 
digital-product redesigns—compare the ease of accepting an automatic 
software update to the time and effort entailed to have an auto dealer 
replace a physical part in a vehicle. This again tends to decrease the 
risk of a negative customer reaction, further lowering R. In short, 
digital markets feature higher potential profits, lower conduct-related 
costs, a lower risk of any losses, and a lower ceiling for any losses that 
do result. 
All of this suggests that anticompetitive digital-product design 
is an unusually attractive strategy as compared to physical-product 
design. In other words, it is relatively much more likely that 
 
Cd < Pm – LR 
 
Profit-maximizing firms will pursue such strategies. Thus, 
anticompetitive product design is relatively more likely to occur in 
digital markets. The core argument commonly put forth in favor of a 
defendant-friendly approach to digital-product design—that such 
strategies are especially unattractive to firms—fails.218 
 
 216. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 217. Newman, supra note 197, at 708 (“[R]edesigning code-based products through software 
updates entails relatively low costs to firms.”). 
 218. Another reason antitrust law historically adopted a hands-off approach to strategic de-
sign is that innovation often benefits society, and antitrust authorities are wary of chilling benefi-
cial innovation. See, e.g., In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 
1003 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Transamerica Comput. Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th 
Cir. 1983); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 776a (“An implicit tying claim must always be 
treated circumspectly by the courts, because the issues will always be highly technical and because 
undue interference will chill innovation.”). For reasons I have argued elsewhere, this concern loses 
most, if not all, of its force in the context of digital markets. See Newman, supra note 197. 
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Whether labeled “implicit tying,”219 “technological tying,”220 
“predatory innovation,”221 or something else, design-related 
exclusionary strategies are uniquely attractive in digital markets. The 
associated risks and costs are lower, and the potential profits higher, as 
compared with traditional brick-and-mortar contexts. As a prescriptive 
matter, this militates in favor of a less deferential standard than the 
antitrust enterprise has historically employed. 
D. Digital Blackmail 
Though it is not entirely exclusive to the digital context, digital 
markets also facilitate a somewhat unusual method of extracting 
monopoly profits: “digital blackmail.” Digital blackmail can occur when 
a dominant platform extracts rents by displaying (or threatening to 
display) unwanted information, then charging victims for its removal 
or concealment. Digital blackmail may also involve the inverse strategy: 
threatening to remove desirable information, then charging victims for 
the “privilege” of continuing to make it available. 
In introductory textbook models, monopolists extract rents by 
reducing output and increasing prices.222 Dominant digital firms, 
however, frequently employ zero-price business strategies.223 As a 
result, they must develop more exotic means of shifting surplus from 
counterparties to themselves. Digital blackmail is one such means. 
A dominant digital portal controls the flow of information to its 
users.224 The resulting relationship is complex, often involving two 
distinct, though related, transactions. In the first transaction, users 
access a given portal, typically surrendering their personal information 
or attention to advertisements in exchange for access to the desired 
digital service.225 A given user may also be seeking to engage in a second 
transaction with a different counterparty.226 Such users access a digital 
 
 219. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 206, ¶ 776a. 
 220. Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., No. C 05-00037 JW, 2009 WL 10678931, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. May 15, 2009) (“[S]everal cases acknowledge the potential for liability based on a so-called 
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to purchase both products.”). 
 221. Schrepel, supra note 198. 
 222. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 501 (“Market power is the ability 
to raise price profitably by restricting output.”). 
 223. Newman, Foundations, supra note 15, at 197 (noting that “[c]reative content (e.g., films, 
music, books, and articles), software, search functionality, social media platforms, mobile applica-
tions, travel booking, and myriad other goods and services are now widely distributed at zero 
prices”). 
 224. See supra Section I.A.1. 
 225. See supra Section I.A.1. 
 226. See supra Section II.A. 
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portal (the first transaction) seeking information about which supplier 
to use for this second transaction.227 Thus, for example, an individual 
user may access Zillow’s popular real estate portal (the first 
transaction) for a variety of reasons. If she is a prospective home buyer, 
that user may also be seeking to enlist the services of a realtor (a second 
transaction). In fact, Zillow’s users often choose realtors based on 
information provided by Zillow, which includes the familiar star user-
rating system for local realtors.228  
Consumers’ newfound ability to make purchasing decisions 
based on information gleaned from a single digital source “concentrates 
considerable power in the source.”229 As noted above, Zillow’s own 
investor statements have reported market shares of 67% across all 
platforms and 78% of mobile.230 But Zillow faces a quandary: How to 
exercise its power?231 As to prospective home buyers, Zillow currently 
employs a zero-price business model, which—as a robust body of 
behavioral economics literature demonstrates—exerts a powerful effect 
on human decisionmaking.232 A move by Zillow to begin imposing 
positive prices on prospective home buyers would, because of this “zero-
price effect,” run a substantial risk of triggering a mass exodus among 
such users. Thus, unlike a more traditional monopolist, Zillow may not 
be able to exercise its power by directly increasing price and reducing 
output. 
The plaintiff’s allegations in EJ MGT, if taken as true, may 
illustrate Zillow’s response to this quandary.233 Zillow displays 
“Zestimates,” property-value estimates, next to its real estate 
 
 227. See PATTERSON, supra note 52, at 9 (describing “information that is acquired to help make 
other purchasing, production, or pricing decisions”). 
 228. See Matt Carter, Zillow Launches Agent Ratings, INMAN (Dec. 2, 2010), https://www.in-
man.com/2010/12/02/zillow-launches-agent-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/TQ7P-SVVT]. 
 229. PATTERSON, supra note 52, at 37. 
 230. Newman, supra note 26, at 5. 
 231. Cf. PATTERSON, supra note 52, at 10 (“Although the information providers may deliver 
information for free, they must get revenue somewhere, and they typically get it through advertis-
ing or other fees charged to sellers.”). Zillow does not display obvious advertisements to prospective 
homebuyers, but it does (more subtly) display “Premier Agent” listings prominently in exchange 
for payments from those agents. Users may not even be aware that they are seeing an advertise-
ment for a realtor, instead of a more objective list of those realtors whom users have rated the 
highest. See Newman, supra note 26, at 8. 
 232. See Kristina Shampanier, Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, Zero as a Special Price: The True 
Value of Free Products, 26 MARKETING SCI. 742, 745 (2007) (describing the power of the “Zero-Price 
Effect”). 
 233. Complaint, EJ MGT LLC, supra note 180, at 2 (“Together, Zillow and the Co-conspirators 
Brokers have made anticompetitive, unconscionable, and otherwise illegal agreements regarding 
the display of the Zestimate on Zillow’s website for properties listed through the Co-conspirator 
Brokers.”). Please see the author’s disclosure, supra note 180. To be clear, the present discussion 
is not meant to suggest that Zillow in fact engaged in the alleged conduct, or that, if so, it violated 
antitrust or any other laws. 
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listings.234 For sellers and their agents, the presence of Zestimates is a 
two-edged sword. If the Zestimate is higher than the list price, the home 
appears to be a bargain. But if the Zestimate is lower than the list price, 
the home appears to be overpriced. Thus, from a given seller’s 
perspective, the option to control whether prospective buyers can see 
the Zestimate would be quite valuable. 
Zillow is notoriously reluctant to alter or remove Zestimates, 
even when requested to do so by homeowners or listing agents.235 
According to the EJ MGT complaint, however, Zillow entered into a 
series of agreements that give certain favored realtor agencies 
(Sotheby’s, Coldwell Banker, etc.) the ability to selectively hide the 
Zestimates for their listings.236 In other words, the plaintiff’s theory is 
that Zillow imposes its Zestimates on all listings, but also offers certain 
sellers the ability to effectively conceal Zestimates on their listings—for 
a price. 
The Zillow example demonstrates the possibility of digital 
blackmail, whereby a dominant firm is able to extract rents by 
displaying unwanted information about other businesses, then 
charging those victims for the privilege of concealing or eliminating the 
information. Digital blackmail might also involve the inverse of this 
strategy: a dominant provider might threaten to remove beneficial 
information about other businesses, then charge victims for the 
“privilege” of avoiding the threat. Recent allegations against online 
ratings-and-reviews platform Yelp illustrate the latter permutation of 
digital blackmail.237 Several small business owners sued Yelp, alleging 
that after they refused to buy advertising from Yelp, it removed positive 
five-star reviews from the owners’ Yelp pages.238 
 
 234. Nat Levy, Home-Sellers Continue Legal Battle Against Zillow, Appeal Judge’s Decision to 
Toss Zestimate Lawsuit, GEEKWIRE (May 17, 2018), https://www.geekwire.com/2018/home-sellers-
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 236. Complaint, EJ MGT LLC, supra note 180, at 15. 
 237. Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he business owners main-
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Such schemes are not altogether unique to the digital context, of 
course. Extortion, blackmail, protection rackets—these are time-
honored methods for the powerful to extract wealth from the powerless. 
But the unique attributes of digital markets drastically increase the 
likelihood that such schemes will be employed. The success of a digital-
blackmail strategy hinges largely on the power and importance of 
information, and many digital products comprise pure information, 
suggesting its uniquely vital importance in these markets.239 Moreover, 
suppliers of digital products often employ zero-price strategies and 
cannot easily introduce positive prices,240 creating the need for more 
exotic wealth-extraction methods. Digital blackmail fits the bill. But 
because it does not match the paradigmatic methods used to extract 
monopoly profits, it has largely escaped the notice of the antitrust 
enterprise.241 
 
*            *            * 
 
Under the consensus view, anticompetitive conduct in digital 
markets is rare, and existing paradigms are up to the task of detecting 
and remedying it. But, as the foregoing discussion explains, such 
conduct may be surprisingly common. Unfortunately, it is far from clear 
that the current antitrust toolkit has been an effective means of 
detecting and preventing harm in digital markets. 
III. UNIQUE LACK OF EFFICIENCIES 
Modern antitrust law condones a great deal of seemingly fraught 
conduct where that conduct appears likely to produce efficiencies.242 
Thus, if digital markets were uniquely conducive to the creation of 
efficiencies, perhaps the current hands-off approach would be 
warranted after all. Unfortunately, the opposite appears to be true: 
conduct in digital markets is unusually unlikely to produce offsetting 
efficiencies. As a result, the balance of error costs favors a more vigilant 
stance toward digital markets.  
 
 239. PATTERSON, supra note 52, at 8 (“[O]ne can view these firms [(Internet retailers, search 
engines, and review sites)] as the latest step in the evolution of competition, with the primary 
forum of competition moving first from production to distribution, . . .  and now to pure informa-
tional promotion.”). 
 240. See sources cited supra note 15. 
 241. Patterson’s excellent and thorough treatment is an obvious exception, and the outcome of 
EJ MGT will be telling. See PATTERSON, supra note 52. 
 242. See, e.g., John M. Newman, Procompetitive Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94 IND. L.J. 
501 (2019) (discussing what it means for antitrust to take into account the beneficial effects of a 
defendant’s conduct). 
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A. Lessons from the Merger Context 
The following discussion begins by deriving what lessons can be 
gleaned from the merger context, an area in which antitrust doctrine 
regarding efficiencies is relatively well-developed and formalized. As 
explained below, both the HMGs and the extant case law suggest that 
merger activity in digital markets is relatively unlikely to produce 
cognizable efficiencies. 
1. Agency Guidance 
The clearest guidance available regarding efficiencies comes 
from the current version of the HMGs. The HMGs, which are based on 
the agencies’ unrivaled experience reviewing proposed mergers and 
acquisitions, identify certain types of efficiencies that are particularly 
likely to be both cognizable and substantial enough to neutralize 
concerns. In particular, the HMGs mention “shifting production among 
facilities formerly owned separately” as a frequently credited 
efficiency.243 From an institutional-design perspective, this raises the 
question: is this “good” efficiency particularly likely—or particularly 
unlikely—to be present in digital markets? 
Firms whose core products are purely digital will, in general, be 
unable to assert this good efficiency. The lack of multiplant production 
in digital markets suggests that this good efficiency will tend to be 
conspicuously lacking across the entire digital sector.244 To the extent 
large pure-digital firms own physical assets, these tend to be office 
buildings and server farms, rather than production facilities.245 When 
Facebook acquired Instagram in 2012 for $1 billion, for example, 
Instagram had only thirteen employees and no offices to speak of, let 
alone any substantial production or distribution facilities.246 Under the 
HMGs, then, that acquisition could not have offered the sole type of 
efficiency recognized as particularly cognizable.  
The HMGs also identify multiple types of commonly asserted 
efficiencies that are particularly “bad,” i.e., “less susceptible to 
 
 243. HMGS, supra note 6, § 10. 
 244. Cf. Posner, supra note 3, at 926 (distinguishing traditional from “new economy” industries 
in part because the former engaged in multi-plant production). 
 245. Interestingly, Posner noted this dynamic, though he drew opposition conclusions from 
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gram, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/instagram-employees-and-in-
vestors-2012-4 [https://perma.cc/U8PK-24A8]. 
       
1540 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:5:1497 
verification” and/or “less likely to be merger-specific or substantial.”247 
The bad efficiencies include those related to research and development 
(“R&D”), which are “generally less susceptible to verification and may 
be the result of anticompetitive output reductions.”248 Bad efficiencies 
also include purported benefits relating to “procurement, management, 
or capital cost.”249 R&D, management, and capital expenditures tend to 
account for relatively large portions of digital-focused firms’ 
expenditures. One might expect, then, that the efficiencies most 
commonly asserted by such firms will fall into the “bad” categories of 
invalid efficiencies. Existing case law confirms this intuition. 
2. The Merger Cases 
There have been few merger challenges involving digital 
markets, yielding a paucity of caselaw in the area. That said, two such 
challenges that produced reported judicial opinions—United States v. 
H & R Block, Inc.250 and United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc.251—are 
instructive. Litigation offers defendants an opportunity to plan and 
present their best arguments for efficiencies. Judicial opinions thus 
shed especially useful light on the types of efficiencies that might be 
claimed in digital markets, as well as the validity—or invalidity—of 
such claims. 
H & R Block involved a challenge to H & R Block’s proposed 
acquisition of TaxACT.252 At the time, the defendants produced two of 
the three most popular “digital do-it-yourself” tax-preparation 
products.253 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) demonstrated that the 
acquisition would likely produce unilateral and coordinated 
anticompetitive effects,254 shifting the burden to the defendants to 
demonstrate offsetting efficiencies.255 H & R Block apparently 
attempted to point to TaxACT’s lower labor and procurement costs as a 
source of productive efficiency.256 But, as the court pointed out, TaxACT 
enjoyed lower costs because it chose to locate in a small city in Iowa and 
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 254. Id. at 77–89. 
 255. Id. at 89. 
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was “simply more cost conscious,” both choices H & R Block could have 
made on its own without acquiring its rival.257 The Defendants also 
purported to identify IT-related efficiencies, perhaps the closest they 
could come to invoking the HMGs’ good type of efficiency.258 But here, 
again, the court found that the claimed efficiency was not merger-
specific and also not verifiable.259 Finally, and perhaps most damningly, 
the court pointed out that H & R Block had previously acquired another 
software company, then failed to achieve any of the efficiencies it had 
claimed at the time of the acquisition.260 
In 2013, the DOJ challenged Bazaarvoice’s acquisition of 
PowerReviews.261 At the time, the two were the largest U.S. providers 
of ratings-and-reviews platforms for use by e-commerce companies.262 
Again, the DOJ demonstrated the likelihood of anticompetitive effects, 
shifting the burden to the defendants.263 And again, the defendants 
failed to offer any persuasive evidence of efficiencies. Bazaarvoice made 
“no claim that the merger [would] reduce[ ] the marginal costs of 
providing its services.”264 Instead, Bazaarvoice pointed to its post-
merger access to a larger pool of user data, a claim that might 
foreseeably be made in many other digital markets.265 But the court 
pointed out that Bazaarvoice could simply have come to some data-
sharing arrangement with PowerReviews instead of purchasing its 
rival outright.266 Unsurprisingly, the court also rejected Bazaarvoice’s 
asserted R&D-related efficiencies.267 Like H & R Block, Bazaarvoice 
simply failed to prove that eliminating its rival would produce any 
cognizable efficiencies. 
Taken together, these two opinions confirm the hypothesis 
derived above from formal agency guidance: digital markets offer 
relatively few opportunities for firms to achieve productive efficiencies 
via merger or acquisition. As predicted, the merging parties were 
unable to demonstrate any benefits from shifting production among 
facilities, the one type of efficiency particularly favored by the HMGs. 
The merging parties instead tried to rely on R&D-related, 
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management-related, and procurement-related efficiencies. As 
predicted by the HMGs, these purported efficiencies were not valid. 
Digital markets’ unique lack of efficiencies further tips the scales in 
favor of a more active approach to antitrust enforcement. 
B. Alleged Unique Efficiencies 
Nonetheless, some persist in arguing that digital markets are 
conducive to the creation of certain types of legitimate efficiencies 
unique to the digital context. These arguments center on firms’ use of 
personal data and the ability to lower the cognitive cost of switching 
between different products within a given ecosystem. The following 
discussion summarizes and critiques these arguments. 
1. Internal and External Use of Data 
Some argue that digital markets, at least those involving “Big 
Data,” allow opportunities for firms to create unique data-driven 
efficiencies.268 These claims largely center on suppliers’ ability to 
capture users’ personal information and use it to inform internal 
product design decisions. Sokol and Comerford point also to suppliers’ 
ability to monetize users’ data—to sell it externally—as a “pro-
competitive benefit” uniquely available in data-rich markets.269 
 a. Improving Quality: Not Unique 
It is true that firms offering digital products can often track, 
store, and draw on large quantities of their users’ personal data. Search 
engines, for example, benefit from a type of indirect network effect: an 
individual user’s experience can sometimes be improved using the data 
yielded by her predecessors.270 By learning from how users interacted 
with search results in the past, a supplier can redesign its search 
algorithm to yield higher-quality results going forward. The importance 
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to higher perceived search quality.”). 
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of such data, at least over the short run, has been widely acknowledged 
in the computer-science literature.271 
The Microsoft–Yahoo joint venture, cleared in 2010 by the DOJ, 
offers a potential example of such data-related efficiencies. According to 
a DOJ press release, the agency predicted that “[t]he transaction 
[would] enhance Microsoft’s competitive performance because it [would] 
have access to a larger set of queries, which should accelerate the 
automated learning of Microsoft’s . . . algorithms and enhance 
Microsoft’s ability to serve more relevant search results . . . .”272 As a 
result, the DOJ closed its investigation of the proposed joint venture.273 
But the relevant question for present purposes is whether 
internal data use is a unique efficiency. As shown above, the nature of 
digital markets yields a unique lack of certain types of efficiencies. The 
question, then, is whether digital markets nonetheless facilitate a 
unique type of efficiency that might, for purposes of rule design, offset 
what is uniquely lacking. 
While use of customer data to improve products might be 
“efficient” (i.e., they allow suppliers to offer a product at lower cost, or a 
better product at the same or lower cost), this is not unique to digital 
markets. As early as the 1950s, consumer research was identifiable as 
a distinct field, with about ten academic articles on the topic being 
published each year.274 Data may not have been as easily or as cheaply 
accessible in a nondigital world, but suppliers could access information 
about their customers via surveys, focus groups, direct observations, 
and a variety of other mechanisms.275 Digital markets may facilitate the 
 
 271. The value of data decays over time. See, e.g., Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
Opinion 1/2008 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on Data Protection Issues Related 
to Search Engines, 00373/EN/WP 148, at 19 (Apr. 4, 2008) (“In view of the initial explanations 
given by search engine providers on the possible purposes for collecting personal data, the Working 
Party does not see a basis for a retention period [for such data] beyond 6 months.”). That said, a 
dominant firm with a larger inflow of data may nonetheless hold a competitive advantage over 
rivals. In other words, the size of the ocean may not matter (much), but the volume of the river 
does. 
 272. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Internet Search and Paid Search Adver-
tising Agreement Between Microsoft Corporation and Yahoo! Inc. (Feb. 18, 2010), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-antitrust-division-its-decision-close-its-investiga-
tion-internet [https://perma.cc/DD8C-ACAZ]. 
 273. Id. 
 274. James G. Helgeson et al., Consumer Research: Some History, Trends, and Thoughts, in 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE IN CONSUMER RESEARCH: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
155, 156 (Jagdish N. Sheth & Chin Tiong Tan eds., 1985). And, of course, it subsequently formed 
part of the subject matter of a popular television series, Mad Men. See Dave Kreimer, “Mad Men” 
Portrays Market Research 50 Years Ago, QUALITATIVE QUERY (Aug. 17, 2010), https://nextstepcon-
sult.wordpress.com/2010/08/17/mad-men/ [https://perma.cc/87GY-8DRJ] (describing episode plots 
that involved empirical consumer research). 
 275. Helgeson et al., supra note 274, at 156.  
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collection and storage of users’ data, which in turn may allow suppliers 
to improve their products. But, in comparison to offline markets, the 
difference is (at most) one of degree, not of kind. 
b. Subsidizing “Free”: Not an Efficiency 
Does the ability to monetize users’ data yield procompetitive 
efficiencies? According to some legal scholars, the fact that many digital 
products are offered for “free” represents a clear, obvious benefit to 
consumers.276 Unsurprisingly, Google’s senior competition counsel has 
also advanced this claim: “[T]here’s little doubt that from a consumer 
perspective, free products are usually a great thing.”277 Sokol and 
Comerford explicitly tie these supposed benefits to the monetization of 
users’ data.278 Digital-product suppliers can use such data to feed the 
growing demand for targeted advertisements. This harvesting and 
reselling of data (the argument runs) “results in obvious consumer 
benefit.”279 
Such claims suffer from two primary defects. First, competition 
law does not prefer low prices per se. One of the most well-settled 
principles in antitrust law, for example, is that price fixers cannot evade 
liability by arguing that they fixed low (“reasonable”) prices.280 And 
predatory pricing—which entails, in part, charging low prices—
remains a viable theory of harm.281 Thus, even if monetizing users’ data 
allows suppliers to offer free (or, more accurately, zero-price) products 
 
 276. See, e.g., David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Free, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 71, 
73 (2011) (conjecturing that a “vast amount of consumer surplus . . . likely results from products 
and services offered for free”); Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free 
Goods: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 523 (2016) (“Free goods 
often provide real benefits to consumers and are clearly procompetitive.”); Sokol & Comerford, 
supra note 88, at 1133 (“In a competition law regime where lower prices for consumers are deemed 
highly desirable, this is undoubtedly a benefit to consumers.”). 
 277. Dana Wagner, Is Free an Antitrust Issue?, GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (July 10, 2009), 
https://publicpolicy.googleblog.com/2009/07/is-free-antitrust-issue.html [https://perma.cc/68BG-
9JXG]. 
 278. Sokol & Comerford, supra note 88, at 1133. 
 279. Id. at 1134. 
 280. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927) (“The power to 
fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix 
arbitrary and unreasonable prices.”). 
 281. Albeit one that has become quite difficult to prosecute successfully. See Daniel A. Crane, 
The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 & n.12 (2005) (identifying two examples 
of plaintiffs succeeding at trial on predatory-pricing claims after Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp. was decided in 1993); Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Re-
coupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1698–99 (2013) (observing that the recoupment element re-
quired by the Supreme Court in Brooke Group “effectively eliminated the viability of predatory 
pricing claims”). 
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to those users, that fact alone would not necessarily represent an 
efficient or desirable outcome. 
Second, the overwhelming majority of digital products are not 
actually free to use. Though users may not pay with fiat currency, they 
do pay with their personal information and/or attention to 
advertisements.282 The “free increases consumer welfare” argument 
may be intuitively appealing, but it is fatally flawed. In syllogistic form, 
it runs as follows: (1) zero-price products offer benefits to consumers,  
(2) consumers reap those benefits without incurring any costs, so  
(3) zero-price products create consumer surplus. The logical flaw lies in 
the minor premise. Consumers do incur costs to acquire “free” 
products.283 There is no principled reason to believe these costs are 
uniformly lower than analogous costs in other markets. Why would 
zero-price transactions—the result of bilateral agreements whereby 
both parties surrender something of value—necessarily create any 
more consumer surplus than transactions involving positive prices? The 
bare fact that many digital-product suppliers employ business 
strategies that involve extracting data and attention instead of fiat 
currency does not represent an obvious benefit to consumer welfare.284 
And the ability to offer a zero-price product does not necessarily 
represent an efficiency. 
2. Google’s Antitrust Paradox 
As described above, building a proprietary ecosystem can be a 
uniquely effective way to erect barriers to entry in many digital 
markets.285 It may be intuitively appealing to conclude that such 
conduct is purely anticompetitive. And, to be sure, proprietary lowest-
cognitive-load ecosystems have potential anticompetitive implications. 
Controlling a digital ecosystem increases the cost to users of switching 
outside the proprietary ecosystem.286 In this context, ease of intrabrand 
switching equals difficulty of interbrand switching. It is relatively easy 
(i.e., less costly in terms of cognitive burden) to switch among the 
 
 282. See Newman, Foundations, supra note 15, at 172–74 (“[C]ustomers pay for zero-price 
products with information and attention rather than money . . . .”); Newman, supra note 92, at 
547–48 (“[W]here Free prices obtain on the user side of an advertising-supported platform . . . ad-
vertising is the mechanism by which the platform is able to offer a Free product.”). 
 283. See, e.g., Eben, supra note 15, at 279–80 (“In exchange for the provision of their personal 
data, consumers obtain access to . . . ‘free’ services.”). 
 284. See sources cited, supra note 282. 
 285. See supra Section I.A.2. 
 286. See Candeub, supra note 6, at 409 (“If we establish habits and routines to allocate our 
scarce cognitive resources, these routines—like many other habits—can be quite difficult, i.e., 
costly, to break, creating high switching costs with possible anti-competitive implications.”). 
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various portals and products offered within the proprietary ecosystem. 
But that very ease also makes it relatively hard (i.e., more costly in 
terms of cognitive burden) to switch to a rival’s product.287 
This can be thought of as “Google’s Antitrust Paradox.” On the 
one hand, lower cognitive load is, ceteris paribus, a benefit to users. To 
situate this concept within current antitrust discourse, perhaps the 
closest analogy is to economies of scope. Suppose a digital-product 
supplier acquires the provider of a complementary product. Relative to 
the pre-acquisition state of affairs, the firm may be able to lower users’ 
cognitive burden by offering access to both products via one proprietary 
ecosystem. This is somewhat similar to the familiar notion of economies 
of scope that can arise from combining the production of complementary 
physical products. Of course, the analogy is not perfect. Economies of 
scope arise where it is cheaper to produce two products together,288 but 
in the present context, it is not necessarily cheaper for the combined 
firm to produce both products. Yet the end result may be similar: lower 
costs to customers. 
On the other hand, though, those lower costs are yoked with an 
increase in the cost to switch outside the proprietary ecosystem. Here 
again, the analogy to economies of scope breaks down. In a traditional 
market, economies of scope—provided that the lower costs are passed 
along to buyers in the form of lower prices—represent an unalloyed 
good.289 Firm A’s achieving economies of scope does not directly cause 
the cost of Firm B’s product to increase. In the digital-ecosystem 
context, however, A’s ability to lower costs to its users necessarily 
represents an increase in the effective cost of B’s alternative product. 
The lower the costs to use A’s ecosystem, the higher the costs of 
switching to B.  
In the above example, B is obviously harmed. Is the harm good 
or bad when viewed through the lens of antitrust? Not all harm to 
competitors is cognizable under modern antitrust law. If an inefficient 
rival is shut out of a market by its own inability to offer an attractive 
product, the consensus position would view that outcome as desirable. 
But the harm to B is not exactly analogous to the harm suffered by 
inefficient rivals. B might be an efficient rival in the sense that it is able 
to produce a similar product at the same cost—yet A’s kingdom-building 
 
 287. As noted above, lack of data portability exacerbates this effect. See supra notes 128–133 
and accompanying text. 
 288. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 51 (1990) (describing efficiencies formed by the production of different goods to-
gether). 
 289. Assuming, as this Article does throughout, that “good” in the present context properly 
refers to consumer-welfare effects. 
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could nonetheless cause B to experience a loss of volume.290 A’s behavior 
would thus force analysts to confront a tradeoff between lower 
intrabrand switching costs and higher interbrand switching costs. 
Such tradeoffs are not altogether foreign to antitrust law.291 This 
one is somewhat similar to the tradeoff between productive and 
allocative efficiency identified by Williamson.292 Though antitrust 
enforcers were once fairly hostile to claims of productive efficiencies, the 
modern antitrust enterprise has become relatively receptive.293 That 
said, claims of productive efficiencies remain subject to the requirement 
that the efficiencies be passed through to customers.294 In the classic 
tradeoff presented by Williamson, the productive efficiency—lower 
internal cost structure—might or might not be passed on to 
customers.295 In the present context, however, the relevant lower cost is 
necessarily enjoyed by users themselves. Of course, the relevant higher 
cost (of switching to B) is also imposed directly onto users. 
Thus, this unusual dynamic is a two-edged sword. The benefit of 
a lower cognitive burden for users does not come without the increase 
in market power facilitated by higher interbrand switching costs. It 
would be incorrect to view proprietary ecosystem building as purely 
anticompetitive, but it would be just as incorrect to view it as generating 
pure efficiency gains. Perhaps the best tiebreaker is modern antitrust 
law’s general preference for interbrand competition.296 Through that 
lens, ecosystem building appears to do more harm than good. 
In sum, digital markets suffer from a unique lack of 
opportunities for firms to achieve beneficial efficiencies. Despite the 
 
 290. Such harm is not a cognizable antitrust injury. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487–89 (1977) (holding that a rival’s inability to compete on the merits did 
not constitute antitrust injury). 
 291. Indeed, as Allensworth persuasively argues, antitrust law is replete with commensura-
bility problems. See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (2016) (“Antitrust law often must trade off one kind of competition for another, or one 
salutary effect of competition (such as price, quality or innovation) for another.”). 
 292. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 
AM. ECON. REV. 18, 21–23 (1968) (theorizing mergers that reduce average costs can yield positive 
allocative effects notwithstanding the tradeoff of price increases). 
 293. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Efficiency Consideration and Merger Enforcement: Comparison 
of U.S. and EU Approaches, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1413, 1418–19 (2007) (“[T]here is increasing 
evidence that efficiency claims, as spelled out in the Guidelines, have had the effect of persuading 
enforcement authorities not to challenge proposed mergers.”). 
 294. HMGS, supra note 6, § 10 (“[T]he Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely 
would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market, 
e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.”). 
 295. See Williamson, supra note 292, at 21–23 (“[I]t is evident that a relatively modest cost 
reduction is usually sufficient to offset relatively large price increases . . . .”). 
 296. See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977) (“Interbrand com-
petition is the competition among the manufacturers of the same generic product television sets 
in this case and is the primary concern of antitrust law.”). 
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paucity of enforcement efforts in this area, the few reported opinions 
that do exist confirm this intuition. Some argue that digital markets 
offer unique procompetitive benefits, but a closer look demonstrates 
that these purported efficiencies tend to be illusory, not unique to the 
digital context, or rife with anticompetitive potential. 
IV. APPROPRIATE RULE DESIGN FOR DIGITAL MARKETS 
Digital markets warrant unique treatment. They present a 
uniquely high likelihood of market power and anticompetitive conduct, 
along with a unique lack of offsetting efficiencies. Taken together, these 
facets counsel in favor of a pro-enforcement stance toward conduct in 
digital markets. But such a stance would be in tension with the value 
some commentators place on maintaining doctrinal unity.297 This raises 
a question: does the antitrust enterprise currently treat digital markets 
the same as their offline counterparts? If so, a higher degree of certainty 
might be warranted before departing from that unified stance, out of 
concern for maintaining doctrinal unity. If not, however—if doctrinal 
unity is already a chimera—antitrust analysts are free to adopt the 
approach that is best suited for the particular task at hand. The 
following discussion demonstrates that digital markets already receive 
differential treatment. Ironically, and unfortunately, that treatment 
has been skewed heavily against, rather than toward, enforcement 
efforts. The remainder of the following discussion offers prescriptive 
suggestions to correct that fundamental error. 
A. The Current State of Play 
It is increasingly well recognized that digital markets already 
receive unique treatment under U.S. antitrust laws.298 As the foregoing 
indicates, digital markets do exhibit unique features that merit a 
uniquely pro-enforcement stance. But the orthodox antitrust enterprise 
has pursued the opposite path, opting instead for a near-total lack of 
enforcement in digital markets. This hands-off attitude is apparent in 
each of the three primary areas of antitrust agency activity: litigation 
 
 297. See generally Waller, supra note 8, at 644 (noting that deviations from antitrust’s sup-
posed doctrinal unity necessarily create rule-of-law concerns). 
 298. See, e.g., Nitasha Tiku, How to Curb Silicon Valley Power—Even with Weak Antitrust 
Laws, WIRED (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-curb-silicon-valley-power-even-
with-weak-antitrust-laws/ [https://perma.cc/B5FW-C8SZ] (“[Tech giants] were allowed to grow un-
fettered in part because of a nearly-40-year-old interpretation of US antitrust law that views an-
ticompetitive behavior primarily through the prism of the effect on consumers.”). 
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challenging anticompetitive conduct, litigation seeking to block 
proposed mergers and acquisitions, and competition advocacy.299 
As to conduct, the government has brought only one substantial 
case since Microsoft. In 2012, the DOJ sued Apple and several 
publishers for agreeing to fix e-book prices.300 It was, in many ways, a 
remarkable case. The DOJ’s choice of targets, for instance, struck many 
as odd.301 The agency is tasked with preventing the buildup and abuse 
of market power. Why, then, did it choose to expend scarce resources 
attacking a handful of publishers whose combined share of e-books sold 
in the United States is less than 25%?302 Why not focus instead on the 
retail level, which is dominated by a single firm (Amazon) that controls 
more than 80% of all U.S. sales?303 But stranger still was the DOJ’s ex 
ante leniency. Viewed in isolation, the case itself was absolutely 
warranted: the defendants engaged in horizontal price-fixing, a practice 
universally condemned by modern antitrust authorities.304 Given the 
 
 299. None of this is meant to downplay the importance of private enforcement, which plays a 
vital role in the functioning of the U.S. antitrust enterprise. See Harry First & Spencer Weber 
Waller, Internet Markets and Algorithmic Competition: The Rest of the Story, 3 CONCURRENCES: 
COMPETITION L. REV. (ONLINE MKTS. & OFFLINE WELFARE EFFECTS – INTERNET, COMPETITION, 
SOC’Y & DEMOCRACY), 2017, at 42, 43 (“Private enforcement actions will continue to fill the gap in 
terms of cases not brought by the government . . . .”). But, particularly given the substantial en-
dogenous and exogenous hurdles faced by private antitrust plaintiffs today, the Agencies, now 
more than ever, must lead the way. 
 300. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 339 (2d Cir. 2015) (upholding lower court’s 
decision that Apple’s conduct was per se illegal). In 2010, the Justice Department filed a complaint 
against and proposed settlement with six Silicon Valley firms that had entered into a series of 
agreements not to “poach” each other’s employees. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice 
Department Requires Six High Tech Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee 
Solicitation Agreements (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-re-
quires-six-high-tech-companies-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee [https://perma.cc/CY25-
5MGD]. But the relevant market(s) at issue were labor markets, not digital markets. See Com-
plaint ¶ 14, United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2010), 2010 WL 
11417874 (contrasting the defendants’ conduct with what occurs “[i]n a well-functioning labor mar-
ket”). The FTC closed an investigation into Google’s search-related practices in 2013, despite a 
staff conclusion that the conduct was anticompetitive. The FTC Report on Google’s Business Prac-
tices, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2015, 7:40 PM), http://graphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report/ 
[https://perma.cc/82L9-GALB]. 
 301. Pasquale, supra note 126, at 47 (“Rather than shaping antitrust law to accommodate the 
publishers’ efforts to mollify the effects of Amazon’s increasingly monopolistic power over book 
sales, the DoJ stuck with a formalistic approach, smothering an alternative in the cradle as a per 
se violation of competition law.”). 
 302. See Amazon Ebook Market Share 2017 – Is It Big Enough?, PUBLISHDRIVE, https://pub-
lishdrive.com/amazon-ebook-market-share/ (last updated Oct. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/57A2-
HSU8]. 
 303. Wahba, supra note 29. 
 304. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d at 297 (“Apple intentionally organized a conspiracy among the Pub-
lisher Defendants to raise ebook prices.”). 
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type of conduct at issue and the salacious underlying facts,305 one would 
ordinarily expect criminal prosecution—yet the DOJ chose to file the 
case as a civil matter instead of bringing criminal charges.306 
As to mergers and acquisitions, the agencies have sued to block 
three deals: H & R Block/TaxAct and Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews, 
which are discussed above,307 and the proposed merger of DraftKings 
and FanDuel.308 What common threads tie these actions together? First, 
despite the prevalence of zero-price business strategies in digital 
markets,309 none of these challenged mergers featured zero-price 
markets. Most of H & R Block’s and TaxAct’s customers paid 
identifiable prices.310 Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews sold their ratings-
and-reviews software to other businesses at positive prices.311 And, 
although many fantasy-sports products do not require payment of entry 
fees to use, the FTC’s challenge of DraftKings/FanDuel focused 
exclusively on the type of online fantasy sports that do require 
monetary payments.312 Second, each of these mergers would have 
resulted in off-the-charts concentration levels, well above the 
thresholds for presumptive illegality.313 Thus, while these actions are 
 
 305. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp 2d 639, 651 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (finding it was not 
uncommon for CEOs of the Publishers to hold private dinners in New York restaurants to discuss 
Amazon’s pricing schemes on e-books). 
 306. Complaint, Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d (No. 12 CV 2826). 
 307. See supra Section III.A.2. 
 308. Complaint, DraftKings, Inc., No. 9375 (F.T.C. June 19, 2017), 2017 WL 3049123 [herein-
after Complaint, DraftKings, Inc.]. A number of deals have been cleared on condition that the 
parties divest some assets or agree to behavioral remedies. See, e.g., United States v. Google Inc., 
No. 1:11-cv-00688, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124151, at *13–32 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2011) (describing be-
havioral remedies agreed to by Google in order to receive clearance for its proposed purchase of 
ITA); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Challenges Reed Elsevier’s Proposed $4.1 Billion 
Acquisition of ChoicePoint, Inc. (Sept. 16, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/2008/09/ftc-challenges-reed-elseviers-proposed-41-billion-acquisition [https://perma.cc/ 
NGU9-59WV] (reporting that the FTC required divestitures before clearing the combination of 
“the two largest providers of electronic public record services to U.S. law enforcement customers”). 
 309. Newman, Foundations, supra note 15, at 151. 
 310. Compare Tik Root & Commentary, Millions of Americans Pay Unnecessary Tax Filing 
Fees—But They May Be Able to Get a Refund, QUARTZ (June 18, 2018) https://qz.com/1307700/free-
file-many-americans-who-file-taxes-online-are-paying-unnecessary-fees/ [https://perma.cc/G9P2-
8VJA] (calculating that only about three percent of eligible tax returns, approximately 3.125 mil-
lion per year on average, have been filed for free over the sixteen-year history of the free-file pro-
gram), with Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for a Pre-
liminary Injunction at Ex. 12, United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(No. 11-00948) (“We, together with our franchisees, prepared 24.5 million tax returns worldwide 
during fiscal year 2011 . . . .”). 
 311. United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 8, 2014). 
 312. See Complaint, DraftKings, Inc., supra note 308, ¶ 16 (“Most DFS contests require users 
to pay an entry fee for each lineup submitted and involve the potential for cash prizes.”). 
 313. See infra note 336 and accompanying text; see also HMGs, supra note 6, § 5.3 (defining a 
highly concentrated market as one with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index above 2,500). 
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certainly commendable, they leave considerable room for expanded 
efforts. Even under existing legal frameworks, antitrust enforcement 
could reach zero-price markets and deals that are less blatantly 
anticompetitive yet still above current thresholds for presuming harm. 
Finally, in the area of competition advocacy, the agencies have 
repeatedly urged courts to side with, rather than against, dominant 
firms. In one striking example, enforcers “aggressively” moved to 
protect digital-private-taxicab companies Uber and Lyft from 
unionization efforts.314 In 2015, Seattle enacted an innovative 
ordinance designed to facilitate unionization among the city’s drivers.315 
The Chamber of Commerce quickly sued to challenge the ordinance, but 
lost at the district court.316 After the Chamber appealed to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the FTC and DOJ filed a joint 
amicus brief arguing that Seattle’s ordinance was potentially 
anticompetitive,317 and the FTC appeared at oral arguments to reiterate 
its criticism.318 The choice of targets was puzzling. Uber and Lyft 
operate as a near duopoly, together controlling about 96% of the U.S. 
market.319 Uber alone enjoys a 74% share.320 Was a single city 
ordinance, enacted to better the precarious financial situation of a few 
thousand workers, the most pressing competition problem in this 
market? Even more recently, the DOJ filed an amicus brief and sought 
oral arguments in support of Apple and the “indirect purchaser” rule,321 
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Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-204), 2018 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2984, at *12 (“A 
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a disfavored, defendant-friendly doctrine condemned by (among others) 
the bipartisan Antitrust Modernization Commission.322 
In sum, it seems digital markets have received unusual 
treatment from antitrust authorities. Relatively few actions have been 
taken. When action was taken, the targets were generally not digital 
giants themselves. Instead, authorities have repeatedly opposed 
relatively small entities that were seeking to counter tech giants’ 
considerable power. The agencies have sued to block a handful of 
mergers, but only where the proposed deals would have resulted in 
truly extreme concentration levels, and never in a zero-price market.323 
Instead, a number of significant transactions have been cleared in 
highly concentrated, zero-price markets. Google, Facebook, and 
Amazon alone have acquired dozens of head-to-head rivals and 
ecosystem building targets without drawing any serious opposition 
from the agencies.324 
Private enforcement seems to have fared little better. Expansive 
interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act,325 courts’ mistaken belief 
that “free” digital products are immune from antitrust scrutiny,326 and 
numerous other hurdles and pitfalls faced by modern antitrust 
plaintiffs,327 have all combined to stymie private litigants’ efforts to 
counter the power of digital giants. 
Though these skies appear dark, there is a silver lining: the 
antitrust enterprise finds itself free to adopt the rules and approaches 
best suited for the specific task at hand. Concerns over doctrinal unity 
lose much of their salience where antitrust already treats a particular 
sector differently than it treats others. That seems to be the case in 
digital markets, leaving the question of institutional design decidedly 
open. As demonstrated above, the balance of error costs suggests a pro-
 
 322. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at vi (“The Commission recom-
mends that Congress overrule the Supreme Court’s decisions in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe 
to the extent necessary to allow both direct and indirect purchasers to recover for their injuries.”). 
 323. See Newman, Foundations, supra note 15, at 151 (“What little precedent and commentary 
does exist tends to conclude summarily that antitrust law does not apply to ‘free’ products.”). 
 324. See, e.g., Russell Brandom, The Monopoly-Busting Case Against Google, Amazon, Uber, 
and Facebook, VERGE (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/5/17805162/monopoly-an-
titrust-regulation-google-amazon-uber-facebook [https://perma.cc/W3SA-B69L] (describing how 
big tech companies have sought out competitors and bought them out without serious antitrust 
obstacles). 
 325. Meyer v. Kalanick, 291 F. Supp. 3d 526, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 326. Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
22637, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). 
 327. See, e.g., Allensworth, supra note 291, at 45 (noting that courts “often find the presence 
of any plausible procompetitive argument to allow a restriction to pass muster under the Rule of 
Reason” and that “courts often place unreasonable demands on plaintiffs—in the form of empirical 
evidence and unassailable market definitions”). 
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enforcement stance toward digital markets is appropriate. The 
remaining task, then, is identifying how best to achieve that goal. 
B. Inverting the Implicit Presumption 
The antitrust enterprise currently employs an implicit 
presumption that antitrust enforcement in digital markets is generally 
unwarranted.328 This is precisely the position urged by Posner’s 
influential essay. In it, he argued that digital markets pose 
“ineradicable uncertainty”329 and concluded that U.S. states should be 
stripped of all authority to bring antitrust claims.330 Even as to federal 
oversight, Posner seriously entertained the appropriateness of a “zero 
enforcement” policy.331 He ultimately backed away from that rather 
radical proposal, but nonetheless urged extreme caution as to antitrust 
enforcement in technology markets.332 
That proposal was misguided. Digital markets are different, but 
in ways that warrant increased scrutiny, not a free pass. In light of the 
unique likelihood of market power and harm in digital markets, 
structural presumptions should in practice be relatively less defendant 
friendly in digital markets than they presently are in other markets. 
Instead of the current heavy presumption against antitrust 
enforcement in digital markets, courts and enforcers should consider 
imposing a presumption in favor of such scrutiny.  
In fact, against the current backdrop of persistent 
nonenforcement, even treating digital markets the same as other 
markets might be an improvement over current policy. As to merger 
enforcement, for example, the HMGs purport to treat most mergers that 
cause the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) to exceed 2,500 as 
presumptively anticompetitive.333 Recent agency actions in nondigital 
markets have challenged deals that would result in HHIs as low as 
3,600.334 In the not-too-distant past, the FTC challenged a hospital 
 
 328. See, e.g., Nazzini, supra note 88, at 4 (“Primum non nocere, deinde curare. A maxim as 
needed in medieval medicine as in 21st Century competition policy.”). To be sure, Nazzini is more 
sophisticated than most, noting that “disruptive innovation is not an article of faith and cannot 
become a pretext for a non-interventionist agenda.” Id. But this is only after positing that “[i]n 
digital markets, disruptive innovation is particularly relevant” and before suggesting that “barri-
ers to entry in online markets are not necessarily significant.” Id. 
 329. Posner, supra note 3, at 943. 
 330. Id. at 940. 
 331. Id. at 943. 
 332. Id. (“Clearly, though, the byword . . . will be: caution.”). 
 333. HMGs, supra note 6, § 5.3. 
 334. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunc-
tion Pursuant to Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act at 6, FTC v. Wilh. Wilhelmsen 
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merger that would have resulted in an HHI of 3,200.335 Yet the three 
deals involving digital markets discussed above featured much higher 
HHI levels: 8,100 (DraftKings/FanDuel), 4,691 (H & R Block/Tax Act), 
and 3,914 (Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews).336 As to conduct cases, the DOJ 
has challenged multiple restraints of trade involving steering of 
customers in nondigital markets337—yet the FTC declined to challenge 
Google’s steering of its users despite a staff finding of consumer harm.338 
Thus, there may be substantial room for increased enforcement even 
within existing legal frameworks. 
A shorthand way of summarizing the present proposal is that it 
seeks to reframe the question that has typically been posed by courts 
and enforcers confronting digital-market conduct. Instead of asking 
why conduct should be condemned, perhaps the more appropriate 
question is, “Why should this conduct be allowed?” Given the unique 
likelihood of long-run harm and lack of efficiencies described above, the 
answer will often be, “It should not.” 
Where a firm with monopoly power seeks to acquire a potential 
rival—a not-uncommon occurrence in digital markets—this approach 
reflects the position advocated for by the leading treatise. In such 
instances, Areeda and Hovenkamp propose the following framework: 
“the acquisition of any firm that has the economic capabilities for entry 
and is a more-than-fanciful possible entrant is presumptively 
anticompetitive, unless the acquired firm is no different in these 
respects from many other firms.”339 
Additionally, the antitrust enterprise must move beyond its 
current obsession with econometrics, especially the inclination to insist 
 
Holding ASA, 341 F. Supp. 3d 27 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-00414-TSC) (“Post-Acquisition market 
concentration would be at least 3600 by revenue . . . .”). 
 335. See FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1211 n.12 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Furthermore, 
any merger that increases a market’s HHI by over 100, to a post-merger level over 1000, raises 
antitrust concerns. In the present case, the proposed merger would increase the HHI by over 630 
to approximately 3200.”).  
 336. United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *36 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (according to the court’s opinion, “the pre-merger HHI was 2674, and it would 
increase by 1240 to 3915 after the merger.” The source of the discrepancy—2674 plus 1240 equals 
3914, not 3915— is unclear.); United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 72 (D.D.C. 
2011); Complaint, DraftKings, Inc., supra note 308, ¶ 47. 
 337. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding 
that DOJ-challenged steering restrictions “constitute[d] an unlawful restraint on trade”), rev’d, 
838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (holding 
“there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about Amex’s antisteering provisions”); Complaint 
¶ 14, United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 248 F. Supp. 3d 720 (W.D.N.C. 2016) 
(No. 3:16-cv-00311), 2016 WL 3202191 (“CHS’s [steering] restrictions reduce the competition that 
CHS faces in the marketplace.”). 
 338. The FTC Report on Google’s Business Practices, supra note 300. 
 339. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 701d. 
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on econometric “proof” of market-wide price and/or output effects. So-
called “qualitative” evidence has been unfairly maligned by scholars 
who mistrust judicial and administrative authorities. Exogenous 
procedural and substantive law developments have substantially 
reduced the role of juries, long the favored punching bag of those who 
downplay the value of qualitative evidence.340 Yet commentators 
continue to argue that sophisticated judges and enforcement agencies 
will frequently be misled by “smoking gun” documents.341 Are federal 
judges and agencies really so easy to mislead? In any event, these 
scholars’ preferred type of “quantitative evidence” is not immune from 
manipulation.342 Numbers, often incomplete and taken out of context, 
can tell many stories. Any observer of or participant in a modern 
antitrust trial has likely heard two highly credentialed economic 
experts reach precisely opposite conclusions using the same underlying 
data.343 Throughout all of antitrust law’s history, qualitative evidence 
has played an important and useful role. That role deserves to be 
reinvigorated. 
Qualitative evidence is particularly vital in zero-price digital 
markets.344 Such markets will tend not to produce the sorts of data—
particularly relating to prices—often relied on in more traditional 
contexts. But the antitrust enterprise has a congressional mandate to 
oversee and protect competition in all markets, not just those that map 
most comfortably onto the simplistic models that appear in the opening 
 
 340. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 8, at 1200 (“[J]uries are singularly unqualified to resolve com-
plex disputes over industrial organization matters . . . .”). Crane offers a nuanced critique: his po-
sition is that while juries are not qualified to resolve antitrust cases, the actual number of antitrust 
jury trials in a given year is quite small, reducing this Chicago School bogeyman to more of a 
nuisance than an actual threat. Id. 
 341. On this point, see generally Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs vs. 
Cold Economics: The Use and Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and Adju-
dication, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 610 (2005) (“It is inappropriate for courts and regulators to prove 
antitrust violations by relying on the accounting information, business rhetoric, and expression of 
intent contained in business documents, and the likelihood of error resulting from the use of these 
documents is substantial.”). 
 342. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger & Justin Elliott, These Professors Make More Than a Thousand 
Bucks an Hour Peddling Mega-Mergers, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.propub-
lica.org/article/these-professors-make-more-than-thousand-bucks-hour-peddling-mega-mergers 
[https://perma.cc/Y8VM-EQW3] (“[A] ProPublica examination of several marquee deals found that 
economists sometimes salt away inconvenient data in footnotes and suppress negative findings, 
stretching the standards of intellectual honesty to promote their clients’ interests.”). 
 343. See id. (“ ‘This is not the scientific method,’ said Orley Ashenfelter, a Princeton economist 
known for analyzing the effects of mergers. . . . ‘The answer is known in advance, either because 
you created what the client wanted or the client selected you as the most favorable from whatever 
group was considered.’ ”). 
 344. See Newman, Foundations, supra note 15, at 179 (“Price information is quantitative, sim-
ple, and almost costless to gather. Nonprice cost information is qualitative, complex, and relatively 
costly to gather.”). 
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pages of undergraduate economics textbooks and antitrust-law 
casebooks.345 
C. Challenging Consummated Mergers 
It is axiomatic that predicting ex ante the competitive effects of 
a given merger can be difficult. To illustrate, consider the FTC’s ex ante 
analysis of the proposed Zillow/Trulia acquisition. Perhaps there was 
no evidence that the acquisition would produce actual, merger-specific 
efficiencies.346 There was, however, evidence suggesting that real estate 
agents use “numerous methods” other than Zillow’s and Trulia’s portals 
to access potential home buyers.347 There was (unsurprisingly) no 
evidence that ZG planned to stop innovating post-acquisition.348 Thus, 
the FTC may have had a rational basis for its decision to clear the 
proposed deal. Unfortunately, subsequent evidence rather strongly 
suggests that that ex ante decision was incorrect, and that the now-
consummated acquisition has facilitated harmful effects.349 
But what is often quite difficult to predict ex ante can be 
considerably easier to analyze ex post. Why should a harmful merger, 
by simple virtue of having been consummated, not attract renewed 
antitrust scrutiny? In fact, consummated mergers are challenged with 
some frequency.350 This practice should continue, and be expanded, in 
 
 345. See id. at 174 (“Under the consensus view, modern antitrust law takes as its goal the 
protection and promotion of competition in private markets.”). 
 346. See Statement of Commissioner Ohlhausen, Commissioner Wright, and Commissioner 
McSweeny Concerning Zillow, Inc./Trulia, Inc., Zillow, Inc., No. 141-0214 (F.T.C. Feb. 19, 2015), 
2015 WL 757484, at *2 [hereinafter Statement of Commissioners Concerning Zillow, Inc./Trulia, 
Inc.] (stating that the FTC found the evidence of anticompetitive effects “inconclusive,” but not 
mentioning any evidence of efficiencies). 
 347. Id. at *1. 
 348. See id. at *1 (“[T]here was insufficient evidence leading us to conclude that . . . the com-
bined company would have a reduced incentive to innovate . . . .”). On the low likelihood that mer-
ger reviews will identify likely harms to innovation, see John M. Newman, Antitrust in Attention 
Markets: Objections and Responses, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 349. See Newman, supra note 26, at 53 (“Post-deal statements from the combined firm’s exec-
utives suggest the Zillow–Trulia acquisition may have harmed — indeed, may be harming — con-
sumers.”). 
 350. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Consummated Merger Challenges—The 
Past is Never Dead (Mar. 29, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_state-
ments/consummated-merger-challenges-past-never-dead/120329springmeetingspeech.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/74QK-D6PG]; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department 
and New York Attorney General File Antitrust Lawsuit Against New York City Tour Bus Joint 
Venture of Coach USA and City Sights (Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-de-
partment-and-new-york-attorney-general-file-antitrust-lawsuit-against-new-york-city 
[https://perma.cc/HY7H-WKY5] (initiating a lawsuit after learning of the challenged transaction 
only after it had already been consummated). 
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digital markets.351 Ex ante, the likelihood of the unique harms 
described above may be difficult to predict with certainty—but ex post, 
analysis often becomes much clearer.352 
The only traditional concern with challenging consummated 
mergers is that of “unscrambling the eggs”353—it can be difficult to 
unwind business units once combined, and any efficiencies that did 
result from the deal may be lost. But this concern is lessened in digital 
markets. Digital-product suppliers engage in less physical 
intermingling of assets than their offline counterparts, and any 
intangible combination that occurs is relatively easy to unwind. To 
illustrate, consider the FTC’s Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp. 
decision, which involved a consummated merger between hospitals.354 
After the deal closed, but before the agency filed a complaint, the 
merged firm spent about $120 million making substantial physical 
upgrades to its facilities.355 Because these and other benefits could not 
have survived separation of the merged firm, the Commission declined 
to order divestiture.356 But, as noted above, physical plant is much less 
salient in digital mergers. Even the intangible products often maintain 
separate appearances and functionality.357 
The agencies spend a great deal of time reviewing Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act filings regarding proposed deals.358 Some of that time may 
 
 351. It may be worth noting that the current Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ Antitrust 
Division has expressed what could be understood as a contrary view. See US: Antitrust Chief Says 
Tech Dealmaking Spawns ‘Great Efficiencies’, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (July 12, 2018), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/us-antitrust-chief-says-tech-dealmaking-
spawns-great-efficiencies/ [https://perma.cc/A3AZ-PQBU]: 
You wonder would YouTube be as useful and as [much of] a competing force to music or 
in video had it not been enhanced and improved through the tech resources that Google 
had? . . . I think there’s [sic] great efficiencies that could occur from a lot of these. You 
can’t, you know, in retrospect try to second guess that. 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Makan Delrahim). 
 352. See, e.g., Tim Wu, The Case for Breaking Up Facebook and Instagram, WASH. POST (Sept. 
28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/09/28/case-breaking-up-facebook-insta-
gram/ [https://perma.cc/2MH3-JH52] (calling for government enforcers to challenge the consum-
mated acquisition of Instagram by Facebook). 
 353. Debbie Feinstein, Un-consummated Merger, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 18, 2013, 10:44 
AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2013/12/un-consummated-mer-
ger [https://perma.cc/S2HV-99EJ] (“[A]chieving a remedy in consummated mergers [prior to the 
passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act] often involved a complicated ‘unscrambling of the eggs’ to 
restore competition to pre-merger levels.”). 
 354. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2007), 2007 WL 2286195, at *2. 
355. Id. at *38.  
 356. Id. at *3. 
 357. Jon Fingas, Facebook and Instagram Are Finally Integrated, Sort Of, ENGADGET (Nov. 
15, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/11/15/facebook-and-instagram-unified-business-inbox/ 
[https://perma.cc/5GCG-96JN]. 
 358. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT 
1 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-
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be better spent reviewing “close call” consummated mergers. The 
greater certainty afforded by ex post review is particularly salient when 
the harms at issue are complex relative to the traditional price 
overcharges at the center of most investigations.359 Together with the 
fact that “unscrambling” digital deals is relatively easy, this militates 
in favor of increased scrutiny of consummated mergers. 
D. Statutory and Quasi-Regulatory Solutions 
Erroneous antitrust decisionmaking, in the form of false 
negatives, is particularly common in zero-price markets. For years, 
antitrust authorities overlooked the massive welfare harms that can 
occur—and have occurred—in such markets.360 Courts, enforcers, and 
eminent scholars all have been misled by the myth that where a market 
lacks obvious prices, consumer welfare cannot be harmed.361 If a 
product is free, the story goes, it offers benefit at no cost.362 In fact, such 
“markets” may appear not to be markets at all.363 
The mistake lies in conflating price and cost. Consumers do pay 
for the vast majority of zero-price products: they exchange attention to 
advertisements, personal information, the rights to creative labor, and 
more in order to access zero-price products.364 “Free” products, in other 
words, are often not free. Yet suppliers of zero-price products have thus 
far enjoyed a free pass from antitrust oversight.365 Such unwarranted 
legal immunity distorts the competitive playing field, causing 
inefficient distribution of societal resources and harm to welfare.366 
Enforcement agencies have recently taken steps in the right 
direction. During its review of the Zillow/Trulia merger, for example, 
 
competition-department-justice-antitrust-division-hart-scott-rodino/p110014_fy_2017_hsr_re-
port_c.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T9N-5EQJ] (noting that, in Fiscal Year 2017, more than two thou-
sand HSR transactions were reported). 
 359. See Wu, supra note 352 (“As this analysis suggests, the case for the breakup should be 
relatively clear. Today, we can measure the effects of the lack of competitors to Facebook, in terms 
of higher prices and lower quality.”). 
 360. Newman, Foundations, supra note 15, at 192–94 (describing likely false negatives). 
 361. Id. 
 362. See STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 17, § 1.26 (addressing the myth that “because some-
thing is ‘free,’ it must be good for consumers”). 
 363. See id. (“Because of the lack of transparency, consumers often do not know how much 
they actually pay for these services.”). 
 364. Newman, supra note 92, at 555 (“Consumers who pay for a product via attention or infor-
mation nonetheless pay for that product.”). 
 365. See Newman, Foundations, supra note 15, at 160–62 (“United States legal precedent con-
tains multiple examples of courts creating de jure antitrust immunity by declining to apply anti-
trust scrutiny in zero-price contexts.”). 
 366. Newman, supra note 92, at 575–79 (critiquing the undeserved “protected status” afforded 
to suppliers of zero-price products). 
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the FTC reportedly analyzed the zero-price market for online real estate 
information.367 Relative to past (non)actions, that analysis alone 
represented forward progress. As one FTC Commissioner rightly 
observed, “[T]he mere fact that [anticompetitive] effects occur on the 
‘free’ side of the market should matter little to an antitrust enforcer.”368 
Yet there remains substantial room for improvement. Two 
issues in particular merit concern. First, the FTC investigated only 
whether the proposed merger would likely result in less innovation on 
the user side of the platform.369 But such analyses are almost certain to 
be fruitless, as was the FTC’s inquiry in Zillow/Trulia. Economic theory 
does not offer robust predictions as to whether a particular deal will 
harm innovation competition. We know that Schumpeter’s notion of 
monopoly as the ideal market structure was incorrect, but the 
economics of innovation remain (perhaps necessarily) fuzzy.370 
Moreover, the type of qualitative evidence—internal presentations, 
communications, and the like—that can sometimes fill such voids will 
typically be lacking in the present context. For obvious reasons, CEOs 
seem unlikely to pitch proposed deals to their directors by claiming that 
the merged firm will become less innovative. Little surprise, then, that 
the FTC’s analysis in Zillow/Trulia failed to yield evidence of innovation 
harm. 
Second, even if enforcers were to analyze a zero-price market, 
accurately identify likely or actual anticompetitive effects, and file a 
lawsuit to correct the problem, there is no guarantee that a court would 
be receptive. Past experience, at least in the United States, is less than 
reassuring,371 although judicial analyses in the European Union and 
China have been much more forward-thinking in this area.372 
These domestic problems call for a statutory solution, as well as 
(or alternatively) the type of quasi-regulatory, formal agency guidance 
 
 367. Statement of Commissioners Concerning Zillow, Inc./Trulia, Inc., supra note 346. 
 368. Terrell McSweeny & Brian O’Dea, Data, Innovation, and Potential Competition in Digital 
Markets—Looking Beyond Short-Term Price Effects in Merger Analysis, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 4 
(Feb. 2018), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CPI-
McSweeny-ODea.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ52-RUAZ]. 
 369. Statement of Commissioners Concerning Zillow, Inc./Trulia, Inc., supra note 346, at *1. 
 370. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Movement of Technology, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1119, 1119 (2012) (“[I]nnovation is so badly behaved when compared to the relatively smooth tran-
sitions that traditional price theory finds for competitive processes under constant technology.”). 
 371. See, e.g., Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22637, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (“KinderStart cites no authority indicating that 
antitrust law concerns itself with competition in the provision of free services.”). 
 372. See, e.g., Google Search (Shopping), supra note 148, ¶ 319 (“The Commission concludes 
that a finding of dominance is not precluded by Google’s claim that it offers its general search 
services free of charge.”); Newman, Applications, supra note 15, at 69–71 (discussing the Supreme 
People’s Court’s decision in Qihoo 360 v. Tencent). 
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often offered by the FTC and DOJ. Here, explicit tools are appropriate: 
the problem of “free” does not present the line-drawing concerns that 
might be presented by explicit rules attempting to single out “digital 
markets” for enhanced scrutiny. Products are either zero-price or not. 
Moreover, zero-price business models are particularly pervasive in 
digital markets.373 Thus, a solution focused on zero-price products can 
be relatively precise—and, while appropriate on its own merits, is 
doubly appropriate given the substantial overlap between digital and 
zero-price markets. 
The German experience is instructive. For a time, German 
courts took the view that “free” products could not constitute relevant 
antitrust markets.374 To correct that error, the ninth amendment to 
Germany’s Competition Act made clear that “a market shall not be 
invalidated by the fact that a good or service is provided free of 
charge.”375 A similar addition of this simple language to the relevant 
U.S. antitrust statutes could prevent domestic courts from mistakenly 
granting antitrust immunity to free-product suppliers. 
More comprehensive formal agency guidance would also be of 
substantial value. As the Zillow/Trulia review illustrates, simply 
understanding that markets without prices can be cognizable relevant 
markets—though commendable—is not enough. Analysts may 
nonetheless fail to consider perhaps the most vital aspects of 
competition in such markets: attention and information.376 Formal 
guidance explaining that attention and information overcharges are 
cognizable harms would offer a great deal of utility to all stakeholders, 
including potentially affected firms and their corporate counsel.377 
 
 373. See Newman, Foundations, supra note 15, at 151 (“Alongside the advent of the Internet, 
however, [zero-price products] exploded in number, variety, and popularity.”). 
 374. Germany Adjusts Antitrust Law to Digital Economy and Proposes New Regulatory 
Agency, CLEARLY GOTTLIEB 2 (June 28, 2017), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organize-
archive/cgsh/files/2017/publications/alert-memos/2017_06_28-germany-adjusts-arc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ALR5-NCZ4].  
 375. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB] [Act against Restraints of Competi-
tion], June 26, 2013, BGBL. I at 1750, 3245, as amended by Act of October 30, 2017 BGBL I at 1151, 
§ 18(2a), translation at https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Others/ 
GWB.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6 [https://perma.cc/RR86-PKK2] (Ger.). 
 376. Here again, others are leading the way: in early 2019, German enforcers issued a decision 
concluding that Facebook had abused its dominance by extracting excessive information from its 
users. See Natasha Singer, Germany Restricts Facebook’s Data Gathering, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/technology/germany-facebook-data.html [https:// 
perma.cc/M56J-F6TH] (“[T]he German agency’s ruling is advancing a larger antitrust argument: 
that a tech company’s abuse of its market dominance to amass information about and profile its 
users can amount to a kind of data coercion.”). 
 377. See Jan M. Rybnicek & Joshua D. Wright, Defining Section 5 of the FTC Act: The Failure 
of the Common Law Method and the Case for Formal Agency Guidelines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1287, 1315 (2014) (calling for a formal agency policy statement in order to “give the business com-
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CONCLUSION 
Digital markets have matured since their inception, and our 
understanding of them has grown considerably. Though it may once 
have seemed that the balance of error costs favored a hands-off 
approach to antitrust enforcement in digital markets, it has become 
increasingly clear that this approach is misguided. The risk of false 
negatives and the costs of nonenforcement are far more substantial, and 
the risk of false positives far lower, than conventional wisdom suggests. 
As a result, digital markets do warrant differentiated treatment. But 
the proper approach entails a watchful eye and a ready hand, not the 
laissez-faire status quo. The current defendant-friendly approach to 
digital markets has almost certainly caused massive harm to 
competition and society at large. Worse yet, it runs the risk of 
delegitimizing the entire antitrust enterprise. Antitrust law still has 
much to offer in a digital world, but it must be allowed to function 
properly and fully. 
 
